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ABSTRACT
Alfantoukh, Lina Abdulaziz Ph.D., Purdue University, May 2019. Multi-Stakeholder
Consensus Decision-Making Framework Based on Trust and Risk. Major Professor:
Arjan Durresi.
This thesis combines human and machine intelligence for consensus decision-
making, and it contains four interrelated research areas. Before presenting the four
research areas, this thesis presents a literature review on decision-making using two
criteria: trust and risk. The analysis involves studying the individual and the multi-
stakeholder decision-making. Also, it explores the relationship between trust and
risk to provide insight on how to apply them when making any decision. This thesis
presents a grouping procedure of the existing trust-based multi-stakeholder decision-
making schemes by considering the group decision-making process and models.
In the first research area, this thesis presents the foundation of building multi-
stakeholder consensus decision-making (MSCDM). This thesis describes trust-based
multi-stakeholder decision-making for water allocation to help the participants select
a solution that comes from the best model. Several criteria are involved when deciding
on a solution such as trust, damage, and benefit. This thesis considers Jain’s fairness
index as an indicator of reaching balance or equality for the stakeholder’s needs. The
preferred scenario is when having a high trust, low damages and high benefits. The
worst scenario involves having low trust, high damage, and low benefit. The model is
dynamic by adapting to the changes over time. The decision to select is the solution
that is fair for almost everyone.
In the second research area, this thesis presents a MSCDM, which is a generic
framework that coordinates the decision-making rounds among stakeholders based
on their influence toward each other, as represented by the trust relationship among
xvii
them. This thesis describes the MSCDM framework that helps to find a decision
the stakeholders can agree upon. Reaching a consensus decision might require sev-
eral rounds where stakeholders negotiate by rating each other. This thesis presents
the results of implementing MSCDM and evaluates the effect of trust on the con-
sensus achievement and the reduction in the number of rounds needed to reach the
final decision. This thesis presents Rating Convergence in the implemented MSCDM
framework, and such convergence is a result of changes in the stakeholders’ rating
behavior in each round. This thesis evaluates the effect of trust on the rating changes
by measuring the distance of the choices made by the stakeholders. Trust is useful in
decreasing the distances.
In the third research area, this thesis presents Rating Convergence in the imple-
mented MSCDM framework, and such convergence is a result of changes in stake-
holders’ rating behavior in each round. This thesis evaluates the effect of trust on the
rating changes by measuring the perturbation in the rating matrix. Trust is useful in
increasing the rating matrix perturbation. Such perturbation helps to decrease the
number of rounds. Therefore, trust helps to increase the speed of agreeing upon the
same decision through the influence.
In the fourth research area, this thesis presents Rating Aggregation operators in
the implemented MSCDM framework. This thesis addresses the need for aggregating
the stakeholders’ ratings while they negotiate on the round of decisions to compute
the consensus achievement. This thesis presents four aggregation operators: weighted
sum (WS), weighted product (WP), weighted product similarity measure (WPSM),
and weighted exponent similarity measure (WESM). This thesis studies the perfor-
mance of those aggregation operators in terms of consensus achievement and the
number of rounds needed. The consensus threshold controls the performance of these
operators.
The contribution of this thesis lays the foundation for developing a framework
for MSCDM that facilitates reaching the consensus decision by accounting for the
stakeholders’ influences toward one another. Trust represents the influence.
11. INTRODUCTION
”A consensus means that everyone agrees to say collectively what no one
believes individually.” Abba Eban
1.1 Overview of Problem
In real-world problems where complexity exists, there is no single correct answer
that solves a given one [1]. Multi-stakeholder decision-making is considered a complex
problem because there could be various correct answers to select from. It requires
the involvement of humans to discuss the possibility of forming a solution based on
their discussions. The humans participating in the decision have a partial view of the
problem domain because of the diversity of their mindsets, the experiences they have
gained over the years, and their current experiences in various contexts. Therefore,
combining those partial views in the decision-making produces a whole view of the
problem. The challenge is to find a proper mechanism for combining those partial
views during the negotiations about finding the solution or the answer to the problem.
In situations where collective decisions have to be made by a group rather than
an individual, it is essential to find a procedure that facilitates reaching a group
agreement. Without reaching an agreement, then the problem will face a dead end.
A real example is the Challenger explosion [2] when the spacecraft exploded in 1986,
73 seconds after takeoff. Various people participated in the decision to take off:
NASA management, NASA executives, and engineers. The engineers warned against
the launch due to the seal problems. The executives made the decision to take off
instead of listening to the engineers. NASA management made a decision to silence
the engineers warnings. As a result, there was no consensus, and the decision outcome
caused a disaster.
2In general, when considering the consensus process in decision-making, the partic-
ipants gather to propose a solution and then negotiate accordingly. The process ends
when they agree on a solution in consensus. Every solution has an associated interest
for the stakeholders. The conflicting interests of the stakeholders lead to complicat-
ing their negotiation process. The reason for such complications is that humans have
a tendency to rationally propose solutions that serve their best interests under the
assumption of rational choice theory [3].Therefore, it is challenging to adopt or design
a mechanism that causes the stakeholders to be influenced by the others and at the
same time maintains the expected interests.
Computers or machines are solutions to help stakeholders when seeking the best
solution. However, relying on machines alone will lead to systematic decision-making
that generates many solutions and using an algorithmic approach to compute the best
one [4]. Although machines are useful, eliminating humans is not practical because
humans add more information to the decision-making process based on their knowl-
edge, experience, and historical data. In addition, an infinite number of solutions
could be proposed by humans, but a machine would not be able to allocate them all
because computers produce results based on what the humans feed them or based
on what the computers learn from peoples behaviors in the past. Therefore, with
computers, the solution selection algorithm works on a finite set of solutions. This is
not practical in the consensus decision-making process because solution modification
is important during the negotiations.
31.2 Motivation
”For good ideas and true innovation, you need human interaction, conflict,
argument, debate”. Margaret Heffernan
Fig. 1.1. The phases required for the consensus decision-making process.
The stakeholders start by proposing solutions based on the interests the
solutions serve; then, they express their opinions to each other. After
that, they check the group consensus. Finally, if none of the solutions has
achieved consensus, the stakeholders start the process again. This process
might not end if the stakeholders have extremely conflicting interests.
Example: Groundwater allocation applications. There exist different stakehold-
ers such as water suppliers, water users, and environmental policymakers.
The decision outcome is the amount of water to supply to the users under the en-
vironmental policy. However, if each one of the stakeholders has an interest that is
different from the others, then reaching an agreement will be difficult or impossible.
Therefore, a proper procedure is to influence each other while bargaining about the
best solution that benefits everyone.
4There are several challenges when dealing with multi-stakeholder decision-making
due to humans involvement:
• The stakeholders might come from different backgrounds, which leads to a vari-
ety of expertise and, in turn, various proposals in the decision-making process.
• There might be extremely conflicting interests among the stakeholders, which
leads to not agreeing on one decision.
• The stakeholders might have a partial view of the problem domain, which leads
to not knowing the others decision preferences and expectations.
• The stakeholders might not be honest. There could be cases in which one or
more stakeholders manipulate the decision-making process.
It is essential to add a new step or component to the consensus decision-making
process illustrated in Fig.1.1 in order to solve the above challenges. This compo-
nent should help in adding extra information, and, in turn, more knowledge of any
stakeholder regarding the others. Also, this component contributes to combining the
partial views of the decision problem domain corresponding to the stakeholders, which
leads to obtaining a bigger picture of the decision problem. Moreover, this component
can detect the honesty of the stakeholders. Finally, this component could work as
an influential factor when making a decision, which leads to resolving the issue with
the conflicting interests. Moreover, the advancement of technology and the existence
of smart machines make it preferable to combine their capabilities with humans to
achieve group decisions. Therefore, humans add extra information to the decision
problem, and the machines moderate and facilitate the decision-making process to
provide guides to the stakeholders while they negotiate about the correct solution to
a given problem.
51.3 Proposed Solution
”Risk and trust are two facets of decision-making through which we view
the world and choose to act.” Alcalde et al
Fig. 1.2. The phases of the proposed multi-stakeholder consensus decision-
making. It involves humans and a machine. The stakeholders start by
proposing solutions, then express their opinions to each other. Next, the
machine aggregates the opinions about each solution to compute the stake-
holders consensus for each solution. After that, the machine updates the
trust for each stakeholder. Finally, if none of the solutions have achieved
consensus, the stakeholders start the process again.
Multi-stakeholder consensus decision-making involves participants who gather,
propose solutions or decisions, and provide their opinions regarding the other so-
lutions. Obtaining others views is used to gain some insight into the others needs
and, in turn, modify the proposed solution accordingly. The opinions can result from
the stakeholders perceived risk from each decision. Expressing an opinion is translated
into trust.
In this thesis, trust is an essential part of developing a multi-stakeholder consen-
sus decision-making framework to produce a decision outcome agreed on by all the
stakeholders involved in the decision-making process.
6The proposed decision-making framework (MSCDM) can be described as:
• Collaborative: The framework supports having several stakeholders who inter-
act with each other during negotiation by proposing decisions and expressing
opinions about the others decisions.
• Iterative: The framework supports several rounds of negotiation.
• Collective: The framework aggregates the stakeholders opinions to find a deci-
sion agreed on by all of them.hers to find the decision agreed by all of them.
• Flexible: The framework allows the stakeholders to adjust their proposals.
There is no fixed set of decision outcomes.
• Trust-based: The framework supports involving humans in the negotiation, who
have different knowledge and expertise.
• Risk-based: The framework supports having the stakeholders perceived risk
with each decision represented by interest.
• Dynamic: The framework supports updating the trust values after each round
while negotiating.
• Consensus: The framework produces one decision outcome agreed on by all the
participants.
• Computer-based: The framework uses machines to guide the decision-making
process.
The use of trust among stakeholders adds extra information to help them to under-
stand the preferences and expectations of the others. Trust helps to represent and
maintain the stakeholders honesty. Therefore, the framework considers trust to have
an influence on the others, which could lead to changing the proposed solution to one
offered by a highly trusted stakeholder.
71.4 Research Goals
”Recent advances in computer science offer a better way to support multi-
issue, multi-stakeholder negotiation processes, especially by significantly
reducing the time required for negotiation”. Susetyo and et al
The research goal of this thesis is to develop a consensus decision-making frame-
work for multiple stakeholders based on trust and perceived risk to facilitate finding
a decision agreed on by all of them. This thesis proposes a framework for consensus
decision-making that uses the influence of stakeholders toward each other as its core.
Such influence is translated to trust. The proposed framework takes into account the
interests associated with each decision, where the interests include the perceived risks
by the stakeholders. The main research question of this thesis can be summarized as:
What is the trust-based consensus decision-making framework needed
when the stakeholders have conflicting interests?
As this thesis explored the main research question, other fundamental questions
associated with the research question arose.
• How should trust and perceived risk be applied in the decision-making frame-
work being built?
– Does the perceived risk affect trust?
– Can the framework use the trust of the stakeholders to weigh their opin-
ions?
• Does the interest corresponding to decisions for each stakeholder follow a specific
distribution?
8• What mathematical model and aggregation operators are required?
– What is the possible mathematical model for stakeholders interactions dur-
ing the decision-making process?
– What aggregation operators should be used when aggregating stakeholders
interactions?
• Would the trusted stakeholder influence the others in changing their interests
associated with the decisions?
• How does trust help in detecting malicious stakeholders in the proposed decision-
making framework?
These fundamental questions help motivate the development of a consensus decision-
making framework that produces the final decision agreed on by all the participants
by considering the trust relationships among them.
1.5 Assumptions and Limitations
This experimental thesis research involves building a simulator for the proposed
framework. The framework assumes that the stakeholders propose decisions and in-
teract according to the assumptions of rational choice theory and social influence
theory. This thesis work does not include building a mathematical model for risk
computation, rather than assuming that the risk infers the interests of the stakehold-
ers, and such calculations depend on the context.
1.6 Expected Outcome
This thesis involves developing a framework for multi-stakeholder consensus decision-
making based on trust. This thesis expects to develop an algorithm of the proposed
framework and then build a simulator. This simulator operates by being fed with
the potential decision-making scenarios. This thesis intends to focus on capturing
9the interactions among stakeholders during negotiations and translate those interac-
tions into trust relationships. This thesis research combines decision-making, trust,
software engineering, and database design to develop a framework that produces con-
sensus decisions.
1.7 Scope
This thesis focuses on developing a framework that supports selecting a consensus
decision in a multi-stakeholder decision-making field using trust and risk as the main
components. This thesis identifies the framework elements and presents a novel algo-
rithm for integrating them to produce the preferred decision for all the stakeholders.
This thesis shows human and machine involvement in the decision-making, where
the machine coordinates the decision process, and the humans make the choices.
The machine does not produce a feasible solution because there could be more than
one feasible solution from which to select. Instead, it gives the humans guides dur-
ing negotiations. The proposed framework involves expressing the trust relationship
through stakeholders interactions while negotiating. Justifying why one stakeholder
would trust another is outside the scope of this thesis because there could be countless
reasons for trusting someone.
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1.8 Contributions
This thesis adopts measurement theory-based trust regarding the consensus decision-
making framework. In the following subsections, we present the principal contribu-
tions of this thesis work.
1.8.1 Trust-based decision-making
Our first contribution in this thesis is to study the effect of trust on the con-
sensus process in terms of the number of rounds, consensus degree convergence and
consensus achievement. Our result showed that trust was effective in decreasing the
number of rounds by approximately 4 and increasing the consensus achievement by
77%. Moreover, trust affects the rating matrix perturbation by 82% increment, 2%
no change and 16% decrements, whereas it is 100% no change if there is no trust
taken into consideration. Moreover, there is a moderate negative correlation of -0.45
between perturbation and the number of rounds. Therefore, increasing the matrix
perturbation can be useful in decreasing the number of rounds.
1.8.2 The distribution of stakeholders’ preferences
Our second contribution is to study the effect of the stakeholders preference dis-
tribution on consensus achievement and the speed of the consensus process. Our
result showed that the assumption of normal distribution performed better than the
random distribution, as the number of projects that achieved the consensus increased
by 1.3% with normal distribution, and the consensus speed decreased by 3 rounds
with normal distribution.
1.8.3 The aggregation operators selection
Our third contribution is to study the performance of the aggregation operators on
the proposed framework. The aggregation operators are the weighted sum (WS), the
11
weighted product (WP), the weighted product similarity measure (WPSM) and the
weighted exponent similarity measure (WESM). Different performance measurements
were considered such as degree of consensus, correlation between starting consensus
and speed of convergence, correlation between ratings matrix perturbation and the
number of rounds and changing the consensus threshold selection
Degree of consensus
Projects with WPSM and WPEM produce high consensus under the assumption
of trust. The same was true with WA and WP but with lower performance.
Correlation between Starting consensus and speed of convergence
We studied the starting consensus degree of each operator to determine if it has an
effect on the number of rounds. WS and WP had lower starting consensus compared
with WPSM and WESM. WS and WP started with values between 0.4 and 0.8,
whereas WPSM and WESM started with values between 0.8 and 0.95. However,
our results showed that having a larger starting consensus degree did not necessarily
decrease the number of rounds. For example, the average number of rounds for WS
and WP was 6, which is faster than WPSM by 4 rounds, but at the same time, WESM
had a larger starting consensus than them.
Correlation between Ratings matrix perturbation and number of rounds
We studies the rating matrix perturbation of each operator to determine if such
perturbation would have an effect on the number of rounds. Our result showed
that WS has a negative moderate correlation, 0.54 and WP has a negative moderate
correlation, -0.6, while WPSM has no correlation, 0, and WPEM has a moderate
positive correlation. This means the WS and WP operators were sensitive to the
changes of the ratings more than the other operators.
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Different consensus threshold selection
The selection of the consensus threshold has an effect on the number of rounds
needed and the consensus achievement. In terms of the number of rounds, WPSM has
the worst performance when the threshold is 1 and its number of rounds is larger by
4. However, when decreasing the consensus threshold to 0.90, WPSM became faster
by reducing the number of rounds by 1, 2 and 3 compared to WESM, WS and WP,
respectively. Similar to the consensus achievement, with WPSM, the achievement is
lower by 78% and is higher than WESM, WS and WP by 1%, 4% and 6%, respectively.
1.9 Dissertation Structure
• Chapter 2 Survey of Multi-stakeholder Decision-Making based on Trust and
Risk. Chapter 2 presents the existing schemes of using trust and risk in decision-
making, whether it is individual or multi-stakeholder. It shows the group
decision-making process, model, and application for each scheme and addresses
the limitations that can be solved by the framework proposed in this thesis.
• Chapter 3 Trust-Based Multi-stakeholder Decision Making in Water Allocation
System. Chapter 3 builds a multi-stakeholder Decision-Making Model having
these characteristics: trust, damages, and benefits as criteria, trust is associated
with the involvement of the human. The model is dynamic by adapting to the
changes over time. The decision to select is the solution that is fair with almost
everyone. This model is the basis for building the generic framework in chapter
4.
• Chapter 4 Multi-stakeholder Consensus Decision-Making based on Trust: A
Generic Framework. Chapter 4 presents the design of the proposed framework
by showing the components involved. It describes the simulator built for im-
plementing the framework design and then evaluates the effect of trust on the
13
decision-making performance in terms of reaching an agreement and reducing
the time required to achieve the agreement.
• Chapter 5 Rating Matrix Perturbation in the Multi-stakeholder Decision-Making
Framework. Chapter 5 presents the changes in the rating matrix during stake-
holders negotiations throughout the rounds being held. It measures the changes
by considering the concept of matrix perturbation, where such a change can lead
to the convergence of the consensus threshold.
• Chapter 6 Rating Aggregation in the Multi-stakeholder Decision-Making Frame-
work. Chapter 6 studies the potential operators for rating aggregations and
compares their performance using the simulator built for the framework.
• Chapter 7 Conclusions. Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis study, highlights thesis
contributions, and uses the thesis results to recommend future research direc-
tions.
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2. SURVEY IN MULTI-STAKEHOLDER
DECISION-MAKING BASED ON TRUST
2.1 Abstract
Decision-making is expected to be encountered in many aspects of peoples lives
and is involved in fields such as economy, business, health care, and education. There
are also different methods of making a decision as well as various factors that affect
making such decisions. Decision-making, therefore, depends on the context. It can
be individual or group level. Group decisions are more challenging than individual
decisions because of the existence of conflicting objectives among the participants or
stakeholders. Group decisions may require negotiation, which involve the stakeholders
influences on each other. Such influences could be acquired from the trust among
them. Therefore, trust is used as a criterion for making group decisions. Usually, the
decisions come with consequences even if it is short term or long term; therefore, it is
important to put those consequences into consideration before making any selections.
Such consequences can be addressed by perceived risk. The main contribution of this
chapter is that it applies trust and risk in the study of multistakeholder decision-
making by considering the use these factors as decision criteria. Additionally, we
study multistakeholder decision-making processes and models based on our analysis
of existing works.
2.2 Introduction
In real life, people encounter different situations, ranging from critical to noncriti-
cal, that entail making a selection among several options. Therefore, there have to be
some techniques or methods that help people with the selection process. Trust and
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risk are criteria used for decision-making because of the uncertainty of consequences
involved in these situations. One study [5] stated that ”Risk and trust are two tools
for making decisions in an uncertain environment.”
In multistakeholder decision-making, a group of people proposes an action or so-
lution. From a psychological perspective, each individual in the group builds an
impression toward others based on his or her selection or experience. As a result,
we can imagine a network of participants who represent nodes and the links between
them are the feelings they build for each other. This impression can be translated
to trust. In this situation, each person proposes a solution that is feasible to him-
or herself regardless of the effect it may have on others. Therefore, the multistake-
holder decision-making model should help reach a solution that benefits everyone and
prevents damage to the network of participants.
Numerous works on decision-making use different factors depending on the field
and even the applications within the fields. Those factors can be used to model trust.
Several studies [5–12] showed that trust influences decision-making. Moreover, every
decision comes with consequences and, as a result, makes risk another important
criterion in decision-making. The use and application of trust and risk as the two
criteria in decision-making are beneficial.
Trust can be a result of the decision makers expertise or experiences as well as
the interaction between the decision maker and other entities (e.g., humans and ma-
chines). Several studies [13–23] model these interactions and translate it to trust.
Risk can be the result of estimating the potential damage or loss that may occur
following the outcome of the decision [5,6,8–13,15,17–20].Furthermore, when two en-
tities interact with each other, such interactions, which can influence decision-making,
can be risky [14,16,21–23].
It is necessary to survey multistakeholder decision-making schemes to determine
how to use trust value and risk value when making decisions. Various trust systems
have been proposed, such as [24–34], including our framework [35–45]. This system
has three phases, one of which is decision-making [35]. The outcome of the trust
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management step is a trust value, which is then used in the decision-making phase
subsequently. (Figure 2.1).
Fig. 2.1. Trust Framework which has three phases, each phase depends
on the previous one.
This trust framework is based on measurement theory. To use the trust value
for decision making, we need to acquire knowledge about what others have done
regarding it. This trust management framework has been represented by [36], and it
has been stated that trust modeling and decision making phases are dependent on
context. The main contributions in this chapter are:
• Study the relationship between trust and risk.
• Study multistakeholder decision-making process and models.
• Survey individual decision-making schemes based on trust and risk.
• Survey multistakeholder decision-making schemes based on trust and risk.
• Analyze the challenges of existing multistakeholder decision-making schemes.
There are several challenges associated with multistakeholder decision-making.
For example, the participants may come from various backgrounds and have different
expertise. Also, the participants may have partial views about the problem domain as
well as have conflicting objectives. Regarding the use of trust and risk in a decision,
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several challenges, such as risk quantification and, more specifically, rare events or
those that have never occurred, arise as well. Another challenge can emerge from
knowing how to apply trust and risk as decision criteria.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first survey of multistakeholder decision-
making using trust and risk. The outcomes of this survey include classifying the
processes of multistakeholder decision-making and knowing the trust and risk models
that were used for making decisions.
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.3, we investigate different defi-
nitions of trust and risk, then we introduce the possible relationships between them
by analyzing existing related works. Next, in Section 2.4, we discuss trust and risk in
multistakeholder decision-making by presenting decision-making theories and existing
multistakeholder decision-making schemes. In Section 2.5, we conclude the chapter.
2.3 Trust and Risk
In this section, we discuss trust and risk concepts by listing some definitions and
possible classifications.
2.3.1 Trust
The definition and evaluation of trust can be challenging because trust depends
on the context. For each context, several factors model the trust. One study [46]
pointed out, ”There is a consensus that trust depends on a variety of trust dimensions.
However, there is no fixed set of such dimensions.” According to another study [47],
”Manifestations of trust are easy to recognize because we experience and rely on it
every day, but at the same time trust is quite challenging to define because it manifests
itself in many different forms.” When trust comes into the picture, uncertainty follows.
A study [48] stated that ”trust relationships can be expressed as subjective opinions
with degrees of uncertainty.”
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There is no exact universal definition for it according to one study [49], Another
[50] indicated that many researchers use the definition of trust in a very specific form
relating to topics, such as authentication, or the ability to pay for purchases. Some
authors defined trust with risk [51, 52] . One study [53] defined trust as the level
of reliance placed on an entity based on experience of a particular context. One
study [18] viewed the trust concept as the degree of confidence given to an entity.
Another [54] considered trust as an assurance among participants while engaging in
online auctions. Many researchers defined trust as a subjective probability that leads
an individual to believe that another person will behave as expected [19] and as a
particular level of subjective probability in which an agent assesses one or more agents
to perform a specific action [47,55–57].
Many researchers see trust as an expectation [15, 58, 59]. For instance, one study
[58] stated that trust is ”psychological expectations or subjective belief that people
think the trusted party will fulfill his obligations as their expectations.” Trust has also
been defined as ”the extent to which one party is willing to depend on somebody, or
something, in a given situation with a feeling of relative security, even though negative
consequences are possible” [5, 47, 60]. Trust has been defined with vulnerability; one
study [17] stated that ”trust definition is mainly based on the vulnerability that the
trusting party is exposed to by this trust relation, and both positive and negative
actions taken against this vulnerability by the trusted party.” Some authors view
trust as ”users thoughts, feelings, emotions, or behaviors that occur when they feel
that an agent can be relied upon to act in their best interest when they give up direct
control” [22].
Trust can be classified into several types. For example, one study [51] classified
trust as communication, information, social, and cognitive. Another study [61] classi-
fied trust to be either generalized or specific. Yet another [62] classified it as relational
or calculative. Relational depends on the relations between the parties while calcu-
lative depends on past behavior. One study [47] divided trust into reliability trust
(probability of transaction success) and decision trust (risk attitude defined by the
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decision surface). It also sorted trust as being subjective (sources point of view) or
objective (trustworthiness of the object).
2.3.2 Risk
Similar to trust, risk depends on the context as well. However, several works
interpret risk as the probability of a negative event occurring. When taking risk
into consideration, it is important to identify then evaluate it. The evaluation can
be qualitative or quantitative. One study [60] defined risk as finding the balance
between the likely cost and the possible reward. The cost is based on the likelihood
of harm and its magnitude, which can be hard to asses. Another study [59] defined
risk perception as the ”trustors belief about likelihoods of gains and losses.” Yet
another study [63] defined risk as the probability of exploitation of vulnerabilities in
terms of software. One study [64] mentioned the ISO/IEC TR 133351 definition of
risk, which is related to the likelihood of exploiting vulnerabilities. Risk was also
defined as the likelihood of an unwanted event and its consequence according to some
studies [19, 53].
According to one study [54], perceived risk is defined as customers uncertainty of
outcomes while performing an action. One study [65] stated that risk corresponds to
uncertainty in outcome when making any decision. Another study [23] said that risk
applies to situations when one is uncertain about the outcome. Another study [21]
described risk as the consumers belief about potential adverse outcomes in uncertain
situations. In one study [66], they described risk as the probability of making a
loss. Another study [67] defined it as ”the likelihood of violation of a basic security
property enforced by the system. Basic properties include confidentiality, integrity,
authenticity and non-repudiation.”
From the above definitions, risk seems to depend on the possibility of a negative
event occurring and the consequent amount of loss. Thus, risk evaluation is associated
with probabilistic analysis. According to one study [68], risk is classified as subjective
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and objective or systematic and nonsystematic. Risk can also be categorized in the
way it is evaluated and analyzed, such as through quantitative analysis or qualitative
analysis.
2.3.3 Relationship Between Trust and Risk
It is necessary to understand the relationship between trust and risk to know
how to use them for decision-making. According to our analysis of previous works,
there are many types of relationships. The following subsections show those types of
relationships with the corresponding existing works.
Risk influences trust
In this relationship, risk may influence trust calculation, trust definition and trust
relationships. Many works have shown how risk can influence trust. Some studies
[51, 69] have shown that risk affects trust relationships. Other studies [70, 71] have
shown that perceived risk has a positive influence on trusting human decisions and
consumer trust. However, trust is associated with lower perceived risk [50, 59, 72].
When calculating trust, the risk variable can be used [13, 73, 74]. Risk can be used
to derive a definition of trust called decision trust [5]. One study [75] used a risk
management model to develop trust policies. Another [54] viewed risk as a precursor
of trust.
Trust influences risk
In this relationship, trust may influence risk calculation, risk assessment, risk
mitigation, risk relationship, and risk management. In terms of risk calculation, some
studies [11, 14, 76] used trust values from direct interactions for risk computation.
One study [77] incorporated trust in risk assessments, and another [78] investigated
how trust and control may mitigate risk. In terms of risk relationship, one study [79]
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illustrated that risk inversely depends on trust. If trust is high, then risk is small, and
if trust is low, then risk is high. Another study [80] mentioned that parties who trust
each other are more tolerant of risks. Another study [58] discussed the relationship
between trust and perceived risk and mentioned that users trust in operators and
application service providers would reduce the perceived risk of users. One study [81]
showed that risk and trust are in an inverse relationship. For instance, riskier activities
require a higher level of trust. Risk, in other words, is calculated based on trust. One
study [21] stated that trust influences purchase intentions directly by influencing risk
perceptions. Some studies [62,82] showed the role of trust in risk management.
Complements to each other
Trust and risk can be viewed as complements to each other. One study [49]
demonstrated that most systems consider trust and risk as complementary or ignore
them. In our opinion, having such a relationship might lead to the use of one of them
as a factor for decision-making because the other one is its complement. For example,
if we say that one interaction has a trust value of 0.8, then the risk is 0.2. Therefore,
we can use one of them to make the decision to proceed or not proceed.
No relationship
It is also possible that there is no connection between trust and risk. For example,
trust can be considered as a property of principles but risk as a property of a process
[49]. One study [21] showed that it is common to treat trust and risk as different
concepts. In our opinion, this is practical if we deal with trust as a property of an
entity that can make decisions and uses risk as a property of the decision itself. For
example, someone is trying to decide whether to go on a picnic. He or she may ask
two people whether it will rain. In this example, the individual needs to evaluate
which of the two people is better at prediction; this can be translated into trust. He
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or she must then evaluate the consequences of each decision; this is evaluating risk.
At the end, the person will make the decision based on trust and risk.
Other relationships
There are other relationships between trust and risk than the ones mentioned ear-
lier. For example, trust can be part of risk or vice versa. One study [83] stated that
trust management could be characterized as a special case of risk management, focus-
ing on authentication of and cooperation with actors whose identities and intentions
may be uncertain. According to one study [55] , researchers agree that trustworthi-
ness is a more general issue than risk. Other studies [84–86] discussed the following
risk-taking behaviors. For example, the truster would have more risk-taking behavior
when the level of trust is high. As another example, the truster would need to accept
some residual risks using trust assumption. Trust and risk should work together to
avoid ambiguity according to one study [13]. Similarly, another [68] stated that risk
is always associated with trust. Another study [87] mentioned that that if there is
no risk involved, then trust does not need to exist. The relationship between trust
and risk may be unclear because it is difficult to tell which one influences the other
as shown by one study [54] .
2.4 Using Trust and Risk in Multi-stakeholder Decision-Making
2.4.1 Decision-Making Theory
Theories and concepts
Decision theory can be divided into two branches, normative and descriptive. The
descriptive model aims to predict behavior while the normative model seeks to observe
how ideal people might behave. One study [88] stated that ”Emphasis has been placed
on the normative aspects of human behavior, i.e., how a rational! A person or a group
of rational persons ought to behave, as distinct from descriptive theories, which are
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to explain and predict actual human behavior.” Therefore, decision-making models
can relate to any of these branches. However, the central question is whether we
can categorize each model to belong to a particular branch or not. According to
one study [89], there is a little difficulty in categorizing some models as a clearly a
descriptive or normative.
Expected utility theory is an important theory to address in terms of decision-
making. Utility theory measures preferences related to decisions. One study [90]
mentioned that economists and others have been developing mathematical theories
regarding how people make choices among alternatives. ”These theories center on the
notion of the subjective value, or utility, of the alternatives among which the decider
must choose” . People behave rationally when they have transitive preferences and
that they make a selection that maximizes the expected utility. The basis of expected
utility theory is the vN-M (Von Neumann-Morgenstern) theory. The vN-M utility
theory is useful because it can be used for modeling risk by including it in an axiomatic
foundation [91].
Decision-making can be done based on the preferences of actions. Savage presented
some axioms for restricting preferences over a set of actions. The purpose of Savages
theory is to relate uncertainty or partial belief to rational preferences [92]. He proves
that rational preference can be represented in term of subjective probability and
utility measure. The primitive elements in Savages theory are the set of states, set of
acts, and the preference relations. Expected utility can represent rational preferences.
The set of outcomes is also considered and can be represented by the set of states
because outcome is a new state.
Multiple Criteria Decision Making
Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) makes a decision based on more
than one criteria. One study [93] stated that ”Multiple Criteria Decision Making
is a discipline largely used to solve complex decision problems involving more than
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one criterion.” Several challenges, such as the choice of criteria and the weight as-
signment for each criterion, arise with MCDM. Some studies [94,95] proposed works
to address a situation in which the weight is entirely unknown. Many MCDM tech-
niques aim to solve selection and ranking or sorting problems. One study [96] listed
the following common MCDM methods: weighted sum method, weighted product
method, ELECTRE (Elimination and Choice Translating Reality), AHP (Analytic
Hierarchy Process), and TOPSIS (Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to
Ideal Solution).
Another study [97] stated that the weighted sum method is the best known and
simplest multicriteria decision-making method. If we assume that it is better to have
a higher value of criteria, then the best alternative should have the maximum score
among other alternatives. The score of each alternative can be calculated by multi-
plying each of the alternatives criterion values by the associated weight, then sum the
result. The weighted product method is similar to the weighted sum method but uses
the product instead of the sum. The ELECTRE technique selects the best alternative
from a set of alternatives. However, according to one study [98], ELECTRE is not
the best decision aid. In AHP [99–101], one study [102] stated that this technique is
effective in situations where judgments are made subjectively from different people.
The TOPSIS technique [96,103–105] selects the option that is the closest to the most
ideal solution and the furthest one to the negative ideal solution.
Trust and risk in individual decision-making
Some multistakeholder decision-making models involve individual decision makers
who prefer to make individual decisions before sharing it with others. Therefore, we
study the existing individual decision-making schemes with corresponding models
to analyze the way individual decisions are made. Several decision-making models
exist regardless of the criteria used. For example, some researchers [6, 8, 24, 106, 107]
proposed that their algorithms take predefined criteria as an input to produce the
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result of decision-making as an output. Utility or expected utility is one of the other
approaches. Expected utility takes into consideration peoples preferences about the
available choices with uncertain outcomes. Some researchers [7, 23, 81, 108–113] used
the expected utility value as a criterion for decision-making. In some cases, this
utility value is related to risk. Some works [9,10,12–15,17–21,64,73,80,114–122] used
predefined policies or rules to make decisions. For example, one can put a threshold
value for trust and another for risk then compare the computed trust and risk values
to these threshold values. If the values meet the policy condition or rule, the next
step is to perform a particular action associated with the decision outcomes. Some
researchers [123, 124] used MCDM for producing decision outcomes. Some works [5,
11,16,22,53,68,79,83,125–127] mentioned the criteria used in decision-making without
specifying how to use them for producing decision outcomes or without mentioning the
decision-making approach. Table 2.1 shows a list of the existing individual decision-
making schemes with the corresponding trust model, risk model, and decision-making
models.
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2.4.2 Changing preferences
Interactions among stakeholders when they make a collective decision is important
since they negotiate while they are seeking for a solution to choose. In decision-making
framework that uses machines for moderate the stakeholder negotiations, the interac-
tion could be rating or even written comment to express the others opinion regarding
the individuals choices and preferences [128–136]. Such notion of preferences occurs
in decision-making field [137]. The individuals’ preferences can be changed over the
time due to the changes in the interests. Those interests change can be a result
of the influence by the others [138], the choices made before or even other factors
that are based on the individuals situation at the time of making selection. Several
studies showed that the individual interest and preferences are changing [138–145]
and these study are different in term of the causes that lead changing the prefer-
ences. In [141], they predicted the changes in preferences based on the feedback of
the negotiation process. [142] presented the dominant theories of belief change that
may be called input-assimilating models. They expressed how the subject’s belief
state is transformed upon assimilation of an input. In addition to the different fac-
tors that change the individuals’ preferences, the choices proposed while making a
decision may affect the preferences or in other word, it shapes them [145]. There is
a study [138] explained the change the initial preference of an individual to match
the others choices, either through coercion from others or selection by the individual
team member. Preferences changes can be short term or long term [137,144,146,147].
Short term preferences affect the current choices while negotiating but the long term
one affects the choices in the future. In social psychology field where they study the
peoples’ behavior, there are different theories that predict the preferences changes.
For example, dissonance theory [139, 148, 149] motivates individuals to change their
preferences to match their prior decision that can be a result of a selection they made
in the past based on influence.
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Multi-stakeholder decision-making
Decision-making is not limited only to an individuals decision. Some scenarios
involve more than one person to make a decision. In these cases, it is called multi-
stakeholders or GDM (group decision-making) [150–168]. One member involved in
a group no longer makes the final decision without the involvement of other mem-
bers. For example, when recruiting a new person in a company, several employees
from administration will be involved in the decision. Each person will give his or
her decisions, and the final decision will depend on all individuals opinions. In so-
cial settings, different approaches, such as taking the average of all the participant
responses or taking the majority decision as final, have been proposed. For example,
one study [24] proposed a GDM model that involves participants ranging from expert
to novice. This approach employs the trust model to help in the decision process. If
an individual cannot make his or her preference, then he or she seeks the advice of
other member based on trust. Another study [111] used aggregated decision-making
in urban planning. Each agent makes their evaluations of benefit, cost, and risk of
the available alternatives. These assessments will then be aggregated to form a group
decision. One study [169] combined the GDM method with AHP to evaluate the risk.
Arrows impossibility theorem is used in the field of GDM. According to one study
[170], ”When we consider the group decision-making problem (with more than two
choices), it is clear that it would be nice to have a fair procedure that combined the
individuals preferences about the alternatives (expressed as rankings) into a statement
about the groups preferences about the alternatives while preserving the autonomy
of each individual.”
Multi-stakeholder decision-making process
The involvement of multiple participants when making a decision makes it essen-
tial to construct a process that takes each individual selection into consideration to
reach a final decision. There are different types of multistakeholder decision-making
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processes. However, based on our analysis of the existing works, we found that the
three common processes are consensus, ranking, and voting. Table5.1 shows the de-
scription of these methods and their corresponding challenges. An important point
to mention is that there are some GDM scenarios that combine more than a GDM
process.
Voting, for example, is considered a simple method because it involves making a
decision based on the majority vote. However, its limitation comes from treating all
participants equally even though they are different in terms of expertise. Also, the
outcome of voting may be unsatisfactory for the members whose decisions received less
votes [27]. Consensus, however, does have the advantage of reaching a solution that is
agreed by everyone [26]. Thus, the decision makers need to negotiate several rounds,
and in each round, they must modify their proposed solutions to be decided by other
participants. However, this has its limitation as the participants cannot influence
others, which could lead to an infinite number of rounds. The ranking process is used
in several multistakeholder decision-making model by ranking the suggestions of each
participant [28]. This has the advantage of knowing the degree of group convergence,
which is useful in selecting the solution that receives the higher ranking. However, its
limitation is the difficulty of ranking a large number of decisions. Also, it is possible
that each participant will rank the solutions but will give his or her own the highest
ranking.
In terms of using trust on those processes, it has been applied in a different way
like obtaining the advices from the trusted individuals or weighting each alternative
with the trust of the individual. One study [24] used trust for the consensus process
and showed that the consensus decision is reached when decision makers adjust their
preferences, such as the importance of the decision criteria, which can be obtained
from the advice of other trusted participants. One study [25] selected the solution
with the highest trust value to reach a consensus. This trust value is formulated
using the decision-makers interactions when they propose suggestions. One study [26]
proposed a GDM model that first creates a trust network that reflects the participants
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opinions toward others based on the proposed solutions. In other words, this trust
value considers the participants weights when aggregating proposed decisions. For the
voting process, one study [27] aggregated single votes to a single collective decision and
used trust to weight the influences of the decision makers in decision-making. Another
study [29] also used trust in voting to show the tendency of making a decision in favor
of another participant.
One study [28] proposed a multistakeholder decision-making model to rank the
preferences. However, in some cases, the decision makers may not have enough in-
formation about some alternatives to accurately rank them. Therefore, the decision
makers opinion about such alternatives is influenced by other experts he or she trusts.
Table 2.2.
List of common Multi-stakeholder decision-making process with the asso-
ciated challenges
Process Description Challenges
Voting Take the majoritys opinion The outcome is winning or not
wining.Treat participants equally
Consensus Consider the group decision
instead of selecting one
The outcome is hard to reach if
there is conflict
Ranking Show the degree in which the
group preferences converge
Difficulty to rank the large
number of decisions
Multi-stakeholder Decision-Making Models
According to one study [171], there are five classes of GDM models. The first
model, GDM1, assumes that the decision makers propose then aggregate their in-
dividual solutions, rank them based on their utilities, and finally select the highest
ranked solution. In the second model, GDM2, the decision makers propose their indi-
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vidual solutions and use them as preferences when voting. In the third model, GDM3,
there is a supra-decision maker that manages the decision-making process among the
decision makers. The fourth model, GDM4, finds group utility to reach a consensus.
In the fifth model, DGM5, the decision makers use the bargaining theory. There is
no model better than the others because each model is useful in specific applications.
For example, GDM1 is useful for applications that take individual preferences into
account, GDM2 for applications that use voting as a decision-making process, GDM3
for applications where there is a hierarchy among participants, GDM4 for applica-
tions that take group preferences for the consensus process into account, and GDM5
for applications that deal with resource allocations.
2.4.3 Trust in Multi-stakeholder Decision-Making
Trust in multistakeholder decision-making is crucial [25] because it is a valuable
group component and is essential in the collaboration process. It becomes, however, a
further complicated or more dependent parameter when an expert may be uncertain,
have incomplete information, or cannot access information. Experts have to use their
domain expertise to arrive at a decision. An expert may give his or her subjective
preferences, but they may not be agreed to by other team members. In such situa-
tions, experts have to collaborate, exchange information, and arrive at a consensus.
One study [172] stated that ”Trust can reflect the actual reputation between experts
because it uses the history of an experts actions or behavior. Therefore, it should be
taken into account as a reliable source to be used in deriving aggregation weights for
individual experts.” As a matter of a fact, trust can be used in the decision-making
process to weight the influence of different decision makers [27].
Several schemes for multistakeholder decision-making vary in terms of the trust
model as well as the GDM model and process. In addition, each of the schemes
comes with limitations. For example, some schemes [24, 24, 25, 29, 31–33] do not
allow the stakeholder to modify the decision outcome because there is a fixed set of
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decisions to select from. Such fixed outcomes limit the stakeholders ability to propose
a new outcome. Some schemes [27,28] apply preferences ordering. A large number of
preferences is challenging to the stakeholder to order. In addition, each stakeholder
might rank his or her own preference higher if he or she is the one proposing the
decision outcome. Some schemes [26,34] do not use historical interactions; they may
lead to missing extra information that might help the stakeholder when proposing
solutions and selecting the final decision. Some schemes [26,30] limit trust to specific
stakeholders, which leads to limited information in the problem domain. Figure 2.2
lists the limitations of existing multistakeholder decision-making schemes.
Fig. 2.2. Limitations of Existing Multistakeholder Decision-making
Schemes
Table 2.3 shows the existing multistakeholder decision-making schemes with the
corresponding trust model, GDM process and model, limitations, and applications.
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Tundjungsari, Istiyanto et al
Tundjungsari, Istiyanto et al [24] proposed a multistakeholder decision-making
model for urban planning in rural areas . In their scheme, they combined a trust
model proposed by Abdul-rahman and Hailes [173] and the GDM3 model that as-
signs a supra-decision maker to manage the consensus process. Basically, the supra-
decision maker adjusts other decision makers preferences of the possible alternatives
and weights the criteria to reach a consensus. The trust model includes a trust level
[1,4] that shows the role of the decision maker and a trust value [-1,4] that is the
result of interaction between two decision makers. If a trustee has more than one
route, then the average of the trust value is calculated. This scheme is useful for
applications that require assigning different roles to decision makers based on trust.
The trust value is not used directly in the decision-making outcome.
Indiramma and Anandakumar
The authors proposed a multistakeholder decision-making model for soil erosion
applications [25]. In their scheme, they showed a multi-agent-based collaborative
decision-making framework for distributed environments, where a group of agents
collaborate on social issues. The proposed framework uses social parameters to reach
a consensus in decision-making. Trust is strengthened by familiarity and similarity
beliefs and evaluated during collaboration. The agents update their trust values
dynamically when discussing decisions. The trust value is in the range of [0,1]. The
proposed decision model starts by collecting the decision makers decisions and allows
each agent to discuss any decisions, criteria, and conflicts. The trust values are then
computed and aggregated, and each agent rates those trust values. The highest
trusted decision is selected as the final decision. Therefore, the trust value is used
directly to reach the decision-making outcome.
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Alonso, Perez et al
The authors proposed a multistakeholder decision-making model for applications
that involve large numbers of decision makers [26]. In their scheme, a group of experts
will first be simplified into a smaller group via clustering, but it will still maintain the
diversity of the groups opinions. Therefore, there are two groups: the selected expert
and the nonselected expert groups. The nonselected expert group provides the utility
toward the selected ones to establish the trust network. After, the consensus process,
which has several rounds, begins. In each round, the selected experts show their
preferences for the available options, then the consensus level is checked. The final
step in this model involves the initiation of the selection process using aggregation
of opinions and preferences, which is done via an IOWA (induced ordered weighted
averaging )operator. A trust network is only established in a scenario that does not
use previous trust information from other situations
Rodriguez
The author proposed a multistakeholder decision-making model for social decision
support system applications [27]. In this scheme, the author proposed a process
consisting of three serial stages. The first stage is individual solution ranking, where
individuals review solutions to a problem and rank them based on their opinion. The
second stage is collective solution ranking, which uses voting. The third stage is
solution selection from collective solution ranking. Trust reflects the similarity and
expertise of the individuals and is used to weight the influence of decision makers in
the decision-making process. Conditional probability (i.e., the probability that B is
a good individual given that A knows B) represents the degree of trust.
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Capuano, Chiclana et al
The authors proposed a multistakeholder decision-making model for applications
that have incomplete information [28]. In their scheme, they proposed a model that
adopts fuzzy rankings to collect experts preferences on available alternatives and trust
statements on other experts. Sometimes, experts cannot express an opinion on any of
the available alternatives, leading to incomplete information. Therefore, to estimate
the missing preferences, the Social Influence Network (SIN) addresses the experts
influences. Then, the aggregation process is applied, followed by selection of the best
alternative. Inclusion of elements captured from the opinions of trusted experts uses
trust to evolve the opinions of each expert. Degree of trust is used to weight the FPR
(fuzzy preference relation). Analysis of the data from social networks computes trust.
Lau, Singh and Tan Scheme
The authors proposed a multistakeholder decision-making model for coalition for-
mation applications in multiagent system environments [29]. In their scheme, they
proposed a weighted voting mechanism (WVM) that allows agents to join existing
coalitions. There are two types of votes: agreement and disagreement. The trust
element is the main criterion for deciding the weight in the voting session. The trust
ration can be low, medium, or high.
Sanchez-Anguix, Julian et al
The authors proposed a multistakeholder decision-making model for a bilateral
alternating protocol in electronic systems [30]. In their scheme, they proposed a
mediated negotiation model for agent-based teams that negotiate with an opponent.
This negotiation model defines the communication protocol with the opponent and
the decisions of the negotiation team. Trust only applies to the group meditator
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because he manages the negotiation process and counts the votes from the team
members. There is a maximum number of rounds assigned by the opponent.
Wu, Chiclana et al
The authors proposed a multistakeholder decision-making model for incomplete
linguistic information contexts [31]. They proposed a trust propagation method to
derive trust from incomplete connected trust networks. The decision-making model
consists of computing trust degrees; estimating unknown preference values; deter-
mining the consensus index, consensus identification, recommendation, and feedback;
and establishing a selection process. When the decision-making process starts, each
alternative is presented with criteria. At times, the expert may not provide an as-
sessment. As a result, trust is useful for getting a recommendation from trusted
experts. Their decision-making model is useful for cases where preferences as well as
the usage of linguistic value are missing. Similarly, they proposed a decision-making
model [33] that is different from one [31] that employs dual trust (trust, distrust) and
nonlinguistic assessments.
Liu, Liang et al
The authors proposed a multistakeholder decision-making model for cloud service
suppliers [32]. The proposed decision-making model consists of four stages: ”(1)
Constructing the interval-valued trust decision making space; (2) Determining the
consensus degree at three levels; (3) Visual consensus identification, trust induced
recommendation and rationality analysis; and (4) Selection Process.”. This model
has the advantage of having a fewer number of rounds by using the harmony degree
in addition to the consensus degree.
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Park, Cho et al
The authors proposed a multistakeholder decision-making model for supplier se-
lection [34]. The proposed scheme uses the stakeholder trustworthiness as an influ-
encing factor on the final decision. The decision-making process uses weighted scoring
system, where the trustworthiness are used for the weights. Moreover, decision alter-
natives ranking is applied in this decision-making scheme.
2.4.4 Risk in Multi-stakeholder Decision Making
Due to the consequences that might occur following the decision, using such con-
sequences as decision criteria could be practical to decision makers. Table 2.4 sum-
marizes the existing GDM model with the corresponding risk model.
Li, Kendall et al
In an environmentally conscious world [111] , they proposed a decision support
approach that allows individual agents to make their own evaluations of benefit, cost,
and risk over available alternatives. Then it aggregates individuals alternatives to
form a group decision. They modeled the risk based on evidence supporting logic and
expected utility theory.
Pham,Tran et al
The authors proposed a scheme for business settings [174]. The experiments show
that applying the model for the quantification of expert sensibilities, together with
common sense human reasoning, enhances the capability to best select alternatives
that will achieve the greatest investment returns and reduces losses to be able to
handle various domains in dynamic environments. In their approach, they aggregated
expert preferences and sensibilities, quantified by a self-organizing map (SOM), in
order to select appropriate alternatives.
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Table 2.4.
Multi-stakeholder decision-making scheme with the associated Risk Model
and the decision process
Scheme Description Risk Model GDM
Process
[111] Group decision making
process that allow agents to
express their utilities or
evaluations over different
alternatives
Based on evidence
support logic and
expected utility
theory
Voting
[174] Dynamic group decision
making which aggregates
expert preferences and
sensibilities, quantified by
Self-Organizing Map (SOM)
in order to select appropriate
alternatives
Human Reasoning =
fuzzy rules,
quantitative
knowledge and
reasoning evidence
N/A
[175] Risk-oriented group decision
making for modeling the
inherent risk in the
multi-criteria group decision
making process
Subjective
assessments
Ranking
Wibowo and Deng
In the project selection problem [175] , the authors demonstrated the problem
of evaluating and selecting a supply-chain management information-system project.
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They proposed a GDM for modeling the inherent risk in the multicriteria GDM
process. Subjective assessments model this risk.
2.5 Conclusion
Decision-making is deeply interwoven in peoples lives and is saturated in almost
every field. It also incorporates various methods and factors that can affect the
outcome of a decision. Thus, decision-making depends on the context. It can be indi-
vidual or collaborative, which can be more challenging because of the existence of the
conflicting objectives among stakeholders. Collaborative decisions may also require
negotiation, which requires creating some level of trust among the participants. Usu-
ally, decisions come with consequences. Therefore, it is important to consider those
consequences before making a decision. Decision makers use risk to assess possible
consequences.
The main contribution of this chapter is analyzing the existing schemes of multi-
stakeholder decision-making based on trust and risk. This chapter also explores the
concepts of trust and risk and categorizes the relationship between them to investigate
how to adopt them when designing a decision model. Moreover, we investigate some
decision-making processes such as voting, consensus, ranking, and GDM models. For
future work, we propose a generic multistakeholder decision-making framework that
is applicable to every context and uses trust and risk for multiple stakeholders. The
decision-making model will help to address several challenges, such as conflict in the
interests of stakeholders, the partial view of the problem domain for each of them,
and honesty when proposing a decision.
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3. TRUST-BASED MULTI-STAKEHOLDER DECISION
MAKING IN WATER ALLOCATION SYSTEM
3.1 Abstract
Water allocation domain requires collaboration among stakeholders when mak-
ing any decision regarding the solution to use to get the maximum benefits with
fewer damages. The challenging part of the water allocation system is the interac-
tions among those entities with the existence of conflicts.Therefore, there has to be a
decision-making model that takes the stakeholders into account when producing the
best outcomes. Due to the involvement of people who make the decision, trust among
them comes to the picture. Moreover, every solution is associated with a number of
benefits and damages. Trust is used as primary criteria in decision-making model
along with the damages and benefits associated with each solution. The main contri-
bution of this chapter is to build a multi-stakeholder Decision-Making Model having
these characteristics: trust, damages, and benefits as criteria, trust is associated with
the involvement of the human. The model is dynamic by adapting to the changes
over time. The decision to select is the solution that is fair with almost everyone.
3.2 Introduction
In this chapter, we propose decision-making model for Water Allocation system
to help the participants to be able to select the solution comes from the best model.
Several criteria involved when deciding on the model to choose such as Trust, Dam-
age, and Benefit. The preferred scenario is when having a high trust, low damages,
high benefits. The worst scenario is when having a low trust, high damage, and
low benefit. Before discussing the computation of these criteria, it is important to
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introduce the entities and their attributes. The proposed model has many types of
entities: organization, expert, model and the decision.
Our view about the problem domain involves a network of experts, and each one
of them has an assigned trust value based on several factors such as interactions and
the level of experiences. There are also a set of models with assigned trust value
which is associated with the error of the model. Each proposed solution has benefits
and damages. An important point to mention here is that the quantification of
the trust is based on the management theory. We have proposed a trust model trust
system [35–42]. This trust model has three stages: trust modeling, trust management,
and decision making. The quantification of the trust has been taken care of in the trust
modeling and management phases. The value comes out of the trust management
phase will be applied in the decision stage (Figure 2.1)
When the project starts, each expert proposes a solution about the amounts of
water to divide among everyone. The system will filter out the model according to
the extreme damages. Therefore, the model with extreme damages will be excluded
from the selection. The result is a subset of models. Then Each expert rates the
proposed solutions as well as rates other experts to model the trust. Since each
model is associated with damages, then such damages lead to a risky decision.
As it can be seen, this decision-making model can be described as collaborative
and dynamic one. Collaborative because it is a group decision making, dynamic
because it adapts to the changes over time.
In this chapter, we will list the existing works in section 3.3. Then, in section
3.4, we will address the trust and describe its meaning to the problem domain. In
section 3.5, we list some possible ways of ratings and explain them by examples.
In section 3.6, we present our proposed Multi-stakeholder Decision Making based on
Trust. We apply the proposed model to a scenario in section 3.7. Finally, we conclude
the chapter and show the future direction in section 3.8.
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3.3 Related work
There are several works related to decision-making while using the trust as criteria.
These works are different in term of trust model and decision-making technique.
By analyzing the existing works, we may classify the decision-making techniques to
algorithmic, policy, MCDM (Multicriteria Decision Making) approaches.
Trust as decision criteria has been applied to many existing works in different
applications such as e-banking environment, [6] , online social networks [109], multi-
agent system world [8,18], access control [11,19,64,115,116], economy [73], p2p (peer
to peer) [10, 12–16, 21, 68, 79], mobile payment [22, 58] , voting [9] , cloud comput-
ing [17], cyberspace applications [20], spam detection application [23], mobile inter-
action applications [81] , general application [5]. In term of group decision making
using trust, several works were proposed in different fields. [24–30, 172, 176–178]. In
term of making the decision about Fragmentation-Free Land Allocation with multi-
stakeholder, [179] proposed work and it has been stated that ”We introduce three
frameworks for land allocation planning, namely collaborative geodesign, spatial op-
timization and a hybrid model of the two, to help stakeholders resolve the dilemma
between increasing food production capacity and improving water quality. ”. [4] has
proposed a multi-stakeholder framework for urban runoff quality management and
showed results by using three methods of negotiations such as a non-cooperative
game, Nash model and social choice procedures.
3.4 Trust
Trust is a result of meeting expectation and reaching a level of satisfaction toward
other entities in particular context. Therefore, there is no universal definition of trust
since it is context-dependent. In general, we formulate a trust toward other entity
based on our interaction with them or the level of knowledge in the case of human
and the reliability in case of a model. The factors which are corresponding to the
interaction and model reliability depends on the context. Figure 3.1 shows the chain
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Fig. 3.1. Trust chain among entities in the Water Allocation system
of the trust assigned to the entities in our problem domain. In the chain, there is
a trust between organization and expert, To x,. There is a trust assigned to expert
based on some criteria contributes to human trust, Tx. There is also a trust from the
expert given to the model Tx m. The model also has its trust. The result of the chain
of the trust is a final trust value T which contributes to the decision-making criteria.
Each expert is assigned a trust value based on others judgment toward him; we call
it human trust.This kind of trust is between the humans in the human networks.
It can be quantified by the Social communications between members, Experience,
Background, Number of years of Experience, Profile similarity and Friendship. There
is also a trust relationship between experts and models; we call it Human-to-Model
Trust. This kind of the trust is the one given to the model by the human. It can
be quantified by the frequency of using the model and model ratings. There is also
trust related to the model, but without human judgment, we call it Model Trust. It
is helpful because it contributes to the error of the model. Therefore, the factor that
quantifies this value is the reliability of the model.
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Fig. 3.2. Rating hierarchy structure which involves Direct and non-direct
rating as well as Human to human and Model to Model ratings (H-to-H,
H-to-M). Some ratings are given during the project and some are not (Per
Project, One Time).
3.5 Possible cases of rating
The possible cases are shown in Figure 3.2. The rating has been first classified to
Direct and Non-Direct. Next, each class is classified according to the rating target,
Human or Model knowing that the source of the rating is always human. Then each
class is further classified according to the relevancy to the project, One time or Per
Project.
The following are the criteria to rate about human and model. Some of these
criteria depend on the project (Per Project), and some are not (One Time):
• Human Criteria (One time): Years of Experience and Friendships.
• Human Criteria (Per project): Model Selections.
• Model Criteria (One time): Reliability.
• Model Criteria (Per project): Benefits, Damages, and Outcomes.
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3.6 Multi-stakeholder Decision Making based on Trust
Knowing that there are different approaches to decision making is very helpful
when building a decision-making model. In our view, the decision-making model is
based on a particular algorithm we design (Algorithm 1 ). Additionally, the rules and
policy approach will also be used in case of having group decision making to restrict
the decision makers to the predefined policies like the maximum total amount of water
to allocate. So, our decision-making model is a combination of these approaches we
surveyed. The ultimate goal is to select a model with less damage and high benefit.
This ultimate goal is easy to find for an individual stakeholder. However, with multi-
stakeholder, it is challenging. Therefore each stakeholder computes the fairness of his
solution to estimate his solution fairness to the others.
Algorithm 1 Solution Selection Algorithm based on Trust
1: S = getStakeholders()
2: Soutions = selectSolutions()
3: Damages = ComputeDamages(Solutions)
4: Benefits = ComputeBenefits(Solutions)
5: Utilities = ComputeUtilities(Damages,Benefits)
6: each Si rate solution Mj
7: T = calculateTrust(S,M)
8: Fairness = Jain(Utilities, numberofstakeholders)
9: weightedFairness = WF (Fairness, T )
Figure 3.3 shows the system workflow of this decision-making model. There are
several steps. First, each stakeholder calculates the damages and benefits of the
solution they choose to use those damages and benefits to compute the utilities. Then,
the utilities are computed by subtracting the damages from the benefits corresponding
to the stakeholders for each solution. Next, each stakeholder rates the others about
their proposed solutions to show whether he agrees or not with the solution. As a
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Fig. 3.3. System workflow which has several steps. It starts with propos-
ing solution and the associated benefits and damages. Then, computing
utilities, rating solutions, updating trust network and computing fairness
for each solution
result, the trust value of each stakeholder is updated based on our existing trust trust
system [35–42] . After that, each stakeholder computes the fairness to guarantee that
is everyone happy with the amount to take. The fairness formula is proposed by
Jain [180] (equation 4.1). Finally, Weigh the fairness calculated by the corresponding
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Table 3.1.
Round 1, List of stakeholders and the corresponding trust values
Stakeholder Trust Value
David 0.9
Steve 0.8
John 1
Trust value. If the stakeholders agree with a particular solution due to the best
trusted-fairness then, this solution is selected. Otherwise, the stakeholder enters
another round repeating the same steps but with new solutions.
Jain(x1, x2, ..xn) =
(
∑n
i=1 xi)
2
n ∗∑ni=1 x2i (3.1)
3.7 Experiment and Result
In this section, we are going to apply the proposed solution to a water allocation
by giving a scenario consists of two rounds.
3.7.1 Round 1
To simulate the water allocation scenario for the first round, we assume that
three stakeholders have conflicts. These stakeholders have assigned trust value based
on historical interaction and their profiles. Table 3.1 shows this kind of information.
Then, each one of them proposes a solution which is an amount of water to share with
other stakeholders. Table 3.2, table 3.3 and table 3.4 shows the solutions proposed
by David, Steve and John respectively. After this step, the stakeholders start rating
each other. Table 3.5 shows the rating details. The rating is a 5-star system, five is the
best, and one is the worst. Based on the above ratings, the trust of each stakeholder is
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Table 3.2.
Round 1, The solution proposed by David showing the percentage of wa-
ter for each stakeholders and the corresponding benefit, damage and the
calculated utility which is the damage subtracted from the benefit
Stakeholder Water percentage Benefit Damage Utility
David 50% 1 0.1 0.9
Steve 20% 0.9 0.2 0.7
John 30% 0.7 0.5 0.2
Table 3.3.
Round 1, The solution proposed by Steve showing the percentage of wa-
ter for each stakeholders and the corresponding benefit, damage and the
calculated utility which is the damage subtracted from the benefit
Stakeholder Water percentage Benefit Damage Utility
David 40% 0.9 0.1 0.8
Steve 30 % 1 0.1 0.9
John 30% 1 0.2 0.8
changed. So, it is going to be 0.8, 0.9 and 1 for David, Steve, and John.After updating
the trust value, the fairness index is quantified using the utilities computed by each
stakeholder. The fairness index is calculated according to Jain’s fairness index using
equation 4.2
F =
(
∑n
i=1 ui)
2
n ∗∑ni=1 u2i (3.2)
Where U is the utility. Table 3.6 shows the computed fairness index for each proposed
solution. Finally, the stakeholder decides on which solution to take by considering
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Table 3.4.
Round 1, The solution proposed by John showing the percentage of wa-
ter for each stakeholders and the corresponding benefit, damage and the
calculated utility which is the damage subtracted from the benefit
Stakeholder Water percentage Benefit Damage Utility
David 40% 0.9 0.1 0.8
Steve 25% 1 0.2 0.8
John 35% 1 0.1 0.9
Table 3.5.
Round 1, Rating values from each stakeholders to others about the so-
lutions proposed. This value contributes to updating the trust value for
each participant
Stakeholder (from) Stakeholder (to) Stars
David Steve 5
David John 5
Steve David 1
Steve John 5
John David 1
John Steve 5
the maximum trusted-fairness index. If they do not agree then they repeat the above
process until they decide on a solution.
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Table 3.6.
Round 1, the fairness index values and the weighted fairness index values
for all the solutions proposed by the stakeholders.
Stakeholder Fairness Trusted Fairness
David 0.805 0.64
Steve 0.818 0.73
John 0.996 0.996
Table 3.7.
Round 2, List of stakeholders and the corresponding trust values
Stakeholder Trust Value
David 0.8
Steve 0.9
John 1
3.7.2 Round 2
Table 3.7 shows stakeholders and the assigned trust value. Then, each one of them
proposes a solution which is an amount of water to share with other stakeholders.
Table 3.8, table 3.9 and table 3.10 shows the solutions proposed by David, Steve and
John respectively. After this step, the stakeholders start rating each other. Table
3.11 shows the rating details. The rating is a 5-star system, five is the best, and one
is the Based on the above ratings, the trust of each stakeholder is changed. So, it is
going to be 0.7, 0.9 and 1 for David, Steve and John . After updating the trust value,
the fairness index is quantified using the utilities computed by each stakeholder. The
fairness index is calculated according to Jain’s fairness index . Table 3.12 shows the
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Table 3.8.
Round 2, The solution proposed by David showing the percentage of wa-
ter for each stakeholders and the corresponding benefit, damage and the
calculated utility which is the damage subtracted from the benefit
Stakeholder Water percentage Benefit Damage Utility
David 40% 1 0.1 0.9
Steve 20% 0.9 0.2 0.7
John 20% 0.7 0.1 0.6
Table 3.9.
Round 2, The solution proposed by Steve showing the percentage of wa-
ter for each stakeholders and the corresponding benefit, damage and the
calculated utility which is the damage subtracted from the benefit
Stakeholder Water percentage Benefit Damage Utility
David 40% 0.9 0.1 0.8
Steve 25% 1 0.1 0.9
John 30% 1 0.2 0.8
computed fairness index for each proposed solution. Finally, the stakeholder decides
on which solution to take by considering the maximum trusted-fairness index. If they
do not agree, then they repeat the above process until they decide on a solution.
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Table 3.10.
Round 2, The solution proposed by John showing the percentage of wa-
ter for each stakeholders and the corresponding benefit, damage and the
calculated utility which is the damage subtracted from the benefit
Stakeholder Water percentage Benefit Damage Utility
David 40% 0.9 0.1 0.8
Steve 25% 1 0.2 0.8
John 35% 1 0.1 0.9
Table 3.11.
Round 2, Rating values from each stakeholders to others about the so-
lutions proposed. This value contributes to updating the trust value for
each participant
Stakeholder (from) Stakeholder (to) Stars
David Steve 3
David John 5
Steve David 1
Steve John 5
John David 1
John Steve 3
3.8 Conclusion
In this work, we presented trust-based multi-stakeholder decision-making model
for water allocation to help the participants to be able to select the solution comes
from the best model. Several criteria involved when deciding on the solution to choose
such as Trust, Damage, and Benefit. The preferred scenario is when having a high
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Table 3.12.
Round 2, the fairness index values and the weighted fairness index values
for all the solutions proposed by the stakeholders.
Stakeholder Fairness Trusted Fairness
David 0.971 0.679
Steve 0.996 0.996
John 0.996 0.996
trust, low damages, high benefits. The worst scenario is when having a low trust,
high damage, and low benefit. However, in reality, where different stakeholders are
involved, it is challenging to reach a solution that creates balance for their needs of
the resources. Therefore, in the decision-making process, Jain’s fairness index has
been considered as an indicator of reaching the balance or the equality for the stake-
holders needs. Other challenges occur is that when the stakeholder is not reliable in
term of knowledge and expertise, and then propose a solution by claiming it is fair
for everyone. For this reason, we considered the trust among stakeholders to avoid
such cases. Having Trusted Fairness is useful for ensuring the stakeholder reliabil-
ity, reducing the stakeholder tendency to request the full amount of resources and
increasing the stakeholder’s reputation. However, even though the designed model
helped in reaching the consensus, it has some limitations. The first one is that the
agreement means having equality in the fairness despite the low benefit associated
with the agreed solution to all the stakeholders. In reality, no one will gain from
the selected outcome. The second one, the model requires estimating the damage
and benefit. In fact, those factors are context-depended, and it is more practical to
create an external entity to attach these both factors to the decision model. Chapter
4 addresses these limitations.
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4. MULTI-STAKEHOLDER CONSENSUS
DECISION-MAKING BASED ON TRUST: A GENERIC
FRAMEWORK
4.1 Abstract
The decision-making process is one we encounter in every aspect of our lives,
ranging from critical decisions to noncritical ones. Decision making becomes more
challenging when dealing with multi-stakeholder decisions due to the existence of
conflicts among them and the diversity in their expertise. As a result, the influence
among them which is represented by trust is considered a criteria when making a final
decision. Such trust is a result of the interactions among those stakeholders. Rating
is one of the methods in interactions for stakeholders to express their opinions of one
another. It requires a decision that is agreed upon by everyone, which might take
several rounds before reaching a final consensus decision. In this chapter, we build
a consensus decision-making framework based on Trust. Then we study the rating
convergences in those decision-making rounds and investigate their convergences with
and without trust. Our result showed that trust is useful in the consensus-creating
process, as it decreases the number of necessary rounds and even creates a consensus
when there is an extreme conflict in preferences.
4.2 Introduction
In consensus multi-stakeholder decision-making models, there is a network of ex-
perts who might or might not influence one another. They gather, propose solutions
and modify them in several rounds to reach a solution that suits everyone. During
these rounds, the stakeholders interact with each other to declare their opinions re-
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garding the proposed solutions. Stakeholders can express their opinions with ratings,
which can later be translated to trust. As a result, due to the involvement of hu-
mans who interact during the negotiation, trust comes into the picture. Trust has
many benefits. For example, it provides extra information through the impression
the stakeholders develop of each other over time in a particular context. Also, trust
indicates whether stakeholders have similar interests. Moreover, trust determines the
stakeholders honesty during negotiations. Therefore, the stakeholders reputations can
be created using trust. The more interactions, the better because they increase the
amount of information available about the individuals. The longer the history, the
better because it increases the chances of having more interactions.
There are several challenges associated with Multi-Stakeholder Decision-Making:
• The participants come from different backgrounds.
• The participants have different expertise.
• The participants have a partial view of the problem domain.
• The participants objectives conflict with each other.
In this light, we are going to explain the possible cases of conflicting interests
among stakeholders and the possibility of achieving consensus decisions associated
with each conflict case. Also, we will create consensus decision scenarios with stake-
holders who want to reach a consensus decision. Due to the involvement of ratings,
we are going to study under what condition ratings increase.
When the stakeholders propose solutions, their choices might be based on either
interests or the influence from one another. Therefore, the stakeholders might follow
the Rational Choice Theory [3] when choosing a solution with a maximum interest.
However, if we use this theory as an assumption while selecting the decisions, then
we might end up with no consensus decision especially when the preferences of each
stakeholder are far away from others’ preferences. To resolve such conflict, Kelman
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[181] presented the theme of Social Influence Theory where the individuals attitudes
and actions are influenced by others. Such an influence can be obtained from the
Trust.
In this chapter, we aim to propose a decision-making framework that has the
following characteristics:
• collaborative due to the participants cooperation.
• trust-based due to the involvement of the humans.
• interest-based due to the involvement of the stakeholders’ perceived risk with
each decision.
• dynamic due to the changes of trust value after each interaction.
• a consensus outcome to guarantee that all the participants agree on one decision.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.3, we list the existing related works.
Then we show the generic decision-making framework in section 4.4. After that,
we introduce the trust concept in section 4.5. In section 4.6, we address rating
convergence and aggregations After that, we explain the experimental setup and
results in sections 4.7 and 4.8. Finally, in section 4.9, we conclude the chapter.
4.3 Related Work
There are numerous works related to multi-stakeholder decision making in differ-
ent areas; however, few of them use trust as a factor. According to [172], trust can
reflect the actual reputation between experts because it uses the history of an experts
actions or behaviors. Therefore, it should be taken into account as a reliable source in
deriving aggregation weights for individual experts. In urban planning in a rural area
application, [24] combined a trust model proposed by Abdul-rahman and Hailes [173]
and the group decision-making model that assigns a supra decision maker to manage
the consensus process. In Soil erosion application, [25] proposed a decision model
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that collects decision makers decisions and allows each agent to discuss each decision.
Then the trust values are computed and aggregated, and each agent rates those trust
values. In applications that involve large numbers of decision makers, [26] proposed
a model that involves establishing a trust network by considering the utility. Then
several rounds are held for the consensus process in which the selected experts have
to declare their preferences concerning the alternatives. In social decision support
system applications, [27] proposed a model that involves individual and collective so-
lution ranking by using voting and solution selection from collective solution ranking.
The trust is used to weigh decision makers influence in the decision- making process.
In incomplete information application, [28] proposed a model that considers fuzzy
rankings to collect experts preferences in available alternatives and trust statements
on other experts. In a multi-agent system environment, [29] proposed weighted voting
mechanisms (WVM), allowing agents to join existing coalitions. The trust element
is the main criteria for deciding the weight in the voting session. In an Incomplete
Linguistic Information Context application, [31] proposed a scheme that uses trust to
get a recommendation from the trusted experts for the decision-making process. In
cloud service suppliers applications, [32] proposed a model that consists of four stages:
constructing the interval-valued trust, identifying the consensus degree, identifying
visual consensus and the selection process. Each stakeholder in the decision-making
process has preferences about the choices, which are rational ones. In this regard, the
stakeholders tend to follow the rational choice theory [3]. Therefore, the stakeholders
rank their individual choices according to their associated interests. The ranking of
such choices might follow a specific distribution. For example, [182–186] addressed
the normal distributions about the individual preferences. In this chapter, we will
use these assumptions and the assumptions of having no specific distribution (order
the individual preferences randomly). In multi-stakeholder decision making, each
stakeholder has a preferred decision. Those preferences can be evaluated by other
stakeholders to form collective opinions about them. Therefore, those opinions might
be aggregated somehow. In some applications that involve human and their inter-
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actions, the evaluations from one human about another in a specific context can be
expressed in different ways, such as by a written review, likes or even ratings, [128]
which are defined as intended interpretations of user satisfaction in terms of numerical
values. For example, online purchase sites like Amazon give the buyer and the seller
the opportunity to evaluate each other by sending feedback in a 5-star rating system.
In Twitter and Facebook, there are like and reply options. Expressing opinions by
rating, for example, is very useful when making decisions [129–136]. Several studies
showed rating convergence between humans after several interactions. The ratings
tend to converge toward positive or negative depending on specific conditions. For
example, [129] showed that the ratings converged toward an overall positive rating
using data from TripAdvisor. Another study on TripAdvisor [187] indicated that the
rating behavior relies on the level of satisfaction. If the raters are highly satisfied, then
they tend to think carefully about the ratings they give but if there is no satisfaction,
then they will provide scores of 1-4 randomly.
4.4 Multi-stakeholder Decision-Making Framework Based on Trust
We have designed a generic framework for multi-stakeholder decision making based
on trust that produces a decision agreed upon by the participants. The framework
takes into consideration the interest of each decision, which includes the stakehold-
ers’ perceived risk. In this framework, the stakeholders negotiate with each other
to declare their agreement regarding the other solutions. In this section, we give
an overview of our multi-stakeholder decision-making framework. Fig.4.1 shows our
multi-stakeholder decision-making framework based on trust. It has several entities,
as follow:
• Trust Model: Our proposed trust model [35–43] that is based on measurement
theory.
• A network of individuals: The individuals are the nodes, and the links are the
trust between each pair. The value is computed by the trust model.
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• Solutions: The decisions proposed by the individuals
• Utility function: Each solution has an associated interest, which is objective.
The interest value is calculated by the utility function.
• GDM model: Group Decision Making Model. It takes the proposed decisions
and the trust corresponding to each and produces the consensus value.
Fig. 4.1. Generic Framework of Multi-Stakeholder Decision Making.
An important point here is that there are two types of trust: local and global.
The local trust is related to the ratings exchanged among stakeholders in every round.
The global trust works as a reputation for the stakeholders by taking local trust and
past local trust into account.
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The process in this decision-making model starts with the stakeholders proposing
their solutions. Each stakeholder has an assigned global trust value (Reputation).
Each solution has an interest value that is obtained by the utility function. Then the
stakeholders rate each other to declare their impressions of the proposed solutions.
After that, the solutions are ranked descendingly based on the ratings. The consensus
level is obtained by the rating that the solution received. Therefore, the top value
should have a value equal or higher than a threshold value to indicate that consensus
is achieved. Otherwise, a new round will start(Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 2 MSCDM Algorithm
for all P in Projects do
while R < maxRound do
S= getStakeholder();
T= getTrust(S);
D=proposeDecision();
R=rate(D);
G=Aggregate(R,D);
Consensus=ComputeConsensus(G)
if Consensus ≥ ConsensusThreshold then
Go to the next project
else
Go to next round
end if
end while
end for
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4.5 Trust
Trust is a result of meeting expectations and reaching a level of satisfaction with
other entities in a particular context. Therefore, there is no universal definition of
trust since it is context-dependent [49]. In general, an individual formulates trust
in other entities based on his or her interaction with them or their levels of knowl-
edge. We may define trust as the level of an individuals agreement with a proposed
solution due to the interests or utility associated with it. We model trust by using
the solution ratings during negotiation. We classify trust as local trust and global
trust. Global trust is modeled by using all the historical interactions between any
two individuals. This global trust creates the stakeholders reputations, which they
use as power or weight to influence other decisions. Local trust consists of current
negotiation interactions between any stakeholders. It is used later for updating the
global trust.
We have proposed a trust system based on the measurement theory [35–43]. This
trust system has three stages: trust modeling, trust management, and decision making
(Fig.2.1). The quantification of trust has been taken care of in the trust modeling
and management phases. The value that comes out of the trust management phase
will be applied in the decision stage. The measurement theory, which is a branch of
Applied Mathematics, is useful for quantification using a measurement. However, an
error might occur corresponding to the value after measurement. As a result, finding
and approximating such as an error is very important. This error can be treated as
the measurements uncertainty. For instance, suppose someone wants to know how
much he weighs. He will use a scale to find the weight. However, the weight might not
give the exact value but only an approximation since different scales gives different
measurements based on the scale brand.
In our trust system, we define two metrics, impression and confidence, as continu-
ous values in [0, 1]. The impression m shows the stakeholders usefulness by evaluating
his/her decision. Every two stakeholders have several interactions at different times,
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which lead to a distribution of their impressions of each other M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mk}.
The impression value is the mean of the distributions, m (4.1). The other metric,
confidence c, shows the extent of certainty about the judgments. The confidence
of the judgment is captured by knowing how far away from the real impression the
stakeholder can be (4.2), where r is equivalent to the square root of the variance or
standard error.
m =
(
∑i=k
i=1 mi)
k
(4.1)
c = 1− 2 ∗ r (4.2)
Two important operators in the proposed trust framework: transitivity and ag-
gregation. Transitivity operator is useful in creating a trust link between any pair
of stakeholder if there is no link between them. It helps to increase the density of
the trust network which leads to gain more information about stakeholders interest.
Aggregation operator is useful when there are more than one parallel paths between
a pair of stakeholders. The global trust of any stakeholder could be computed as a
weighted average of the impressions toward him or her and then using the confidence
as a weight. For example, if shareholders j receives impressions and confidences pair
(mij,cij) from n stakeholders, then the trust value (Tj) of j is computed by (4.3) as:
Tj =
∑n
i mij ∗ cij∑n
i cij
(4.3)
4.6 Rating Convergence and Aggregation
Conflicting interests among stakeholders might occur while they are making con-
sensus decisions. There are three cases of conflict overlap; no overlap, semi-overlap
and full overlap (Fig.4.2.(a), Fig.4.2.(b) and Fig.4.2.(c)). The difficulty of reaching
consensus decisions depends on the stakeholders conflicting interests. Our interpre-
tation is that trust offers extra information that guides the stakeholders and reduces
the number of rounds required to reach final consensus decisions. Interactions among
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(a) No overlap.
(b) Semi-overlap.
(c) Full overlap.
Fig. 4.2. The possible conflict of interest scenarios.
stakeholders are needed to formulate the consensus decision. In this light, the rat-
ing from each stakeholder of another regarding the proposed decisions can be used
as a method of interaction. In each round, the ratings among stakeholders can be
increased or decreased.
Let’s assume that the rating system is 5-star rating and stakeholder a rates stake-
holder b. If Ia represents the interest to a , Da and Db are the decisions proposed by a
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and b respectively, then Ia(Da) is the a’s interest from its own decision Da and Ia(Db)
is a’s interest from the decision is proposed by b. If Ia(Db) is more than Ia(Da), then
a gives b the maximum rating because b proposes a solution with good interest to
a. Otherwise, we consider the difference between Ia(Da) and Ia(Db). The larger the
difference the lower the rating and vice versa. Therefore, to find the star value asso-
ciated with the difference, it requires to transform the difference value range to 5-star
value range. The difference (diff) range is [0,1] and the start range is [0,5]. However,
since the larger difference means lower rating, we need to find the transformation
function, f(diff), from [1,0] to [0,5], meaning to find value rate in [0,5] associated
with value diff in [1,0]. If we assume the function to be linear, we may use the affine
transformation function to find the rating from the differences.(4.4). Using the affine
transformation function, we can calculate the rating using (4.5)
function f(diff) : [1, 0]→ [0, 5] (4.4)
f(diff) = 5 ∗ (1− diff) (4.5)
If b is highly trusted, Tbhigh, then the rating could be any number from the range
between the output of (4.4) and the maximum start rating, 5. As a result, a rates b
according to the following:
Ratingab =
Tbhigh, rating= [f(diff),5]otherwise, rating=f(diff)
The stakeholders rate each other during negotiation to show their impressions of
the solution and their preferences. Those ratings have to be aggregated to compute
the overall result of all ratings corresponding to each solution. The weighted aver-
age [188–194] is used as a method of aggregation. Suppose that there is a set of
stakeholders, S, a set of decisions, D, and a set of corresponding trust values for each
stakeholder. The stakeholders rate each other as represented in matrix R, where the
element rij represents the rating from stakeholder i to stakeholder j regarding j’s
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proposed solution. The associated trust for each stakeholder is represented in the
vector T. The sum of the trust values is W. The rating weighted average is RWA
and computed by using R, T and W (4.6), where T is used to weigh the ratings. The
outcome is a vector of consensus degrees (consensusdi) corresponding to the proposed
solutions. The SelectedDecision is the decision with the maximum (max) consen-
sus degree, which is later compared to ConsensusThreshold to check the consensus
achievement.
S = {s1, s2, s3}
D = {d1, d2, d3}
T =
[
T1 T2 T3
]
W =
∑3
n=1 Tn
R =

1 r12 r13
r21 1 r23
r31 r32 1

RWA =
1
W
∗ T ∗R (4.6)
RWA =
[
consensusd1 consensusd2 consensusd3
]
SelectedDecision = max(RWA)
Consensus =
Y es, SelectedDecision = ConsensusThresholdNo, otherwise.
4.7 Experiment setup
The aim of the experiment is to study the effect of trust on the consensus process
among stakeholders. Such an effect can be examined through the number of required
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rounds, the consensus degree average in each round, and the consensus achievements.
We have designed and implemented a simulation to generate decision-making sce-
narios. We used a Netbeans framework with java language to build the simulation
software. To store the data, we created a database using derby and then linked it to
the java program (Fig.4.3).
Fig. 4.3. Simulation Design
Table B.1 shows the parameter setup. The stakeholders have been divided into
3 groups based on the conflict of interest. Then we ran the simulations using these
groups, one with trust and another without. We generated the interests of deci-
sions for each stakeholder to facilitate the proposing and rating process by randomly
generating a number between 0 and 1.0 for the decisions corresponding to every stake-
holder. Also, we generated another set of interest of decisions by producing numbers
that follow a normal distribution. The stakeholders start a round by proposing solu-
tions of high interest to them. Then they rate each other. After that, the consensus
is computed by aggregating those ratings. If the consensus degree is lower than the
consensus threshold, a new round starts. The stakeholders have the option to mod-
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Table 4.1.
List of the parameters used in the simulation with their corresponding
values
Parameter Description Value
NoSH Number of StakeHolders 1000
numbStakehoder Number of StakeHolders per project 5
globalNoD Total number of possible decisions to select
when proposing
1000
pCount Number of Projects generated 12000
roundCount Maximum Number of rounds per project 10
T Trust Value range [0,1]
Interest Interest Value range [0,1]
consThreshold Minimum Consensus Degree 1.0
ify their decisions by choosing the decision that has more interest to others than the
previous rounds decision or keeping the same decision proposed in the previous round.
4.8 Results
The simulation has been executed under the above assumptions using two types of
preference models: Random and Normal Distributions. For the random experiment,
we assumed that the stakeholders preferences do not follow any distribution.
The assumption of the rational choice theory is associated with the ”no trust”
scenarios, meaning the selection depends on the solutions with the expected interests.
The scenario tested with trust is also under the assumption of the rational choice
theory but with taking the social influence theory into accounts, meaning the selection
either depend on the solutions with the expected interests or the solution proposed
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Fig. 4.4. The tree structure of the cases considered in the simulation
by the stakeholder with high influence on others. Fig.4.4 shows the cases that have
been considered in the simulation.
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(a) With Trust.
(b) Without Trust.
Fig. 4.5. Average Consensus Degree in each round for projects for Random
preferences
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Fig. 4.6. Average Consensus Degree in each round for projects that
reached the consensus with Trust for Random Preferences.
Fig.4.5 shows the average consensus degree associated with each round for all
projects. Fig.4.5.(a) reflects the average consensus when taking trust into account,
which indicates an increase in consensus value compared to Fig.4.5.(b), which does
not consider trust.
For the projects that reached consensus after we applied trust, the experiment
showed that the consensus degree tends to increase in subsequent rounds (Fig.4.6).
For the cases where the stakeholders have no overlap in interest, it is impossible
to reach an agreement. However, when we applied trust, the experiment showed that
an agreement was reachable (Fig.4.7).
For the normal distribution experiment, we assumed that the preferences follow
the normal model. The results were similar to the random preferences case. However,
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Fig. 4.7. Number of rounds with no overlap in interest with and without
trust for Random Preferences.
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the performance is better. For instance, if there is overlap in interest, the stakehold-
ers reach agreement in the first round because they prefer the same decision at the
beginning of the negotiation process.
The summary of the results is presented in Tables 4.2 , 4.3, 4.4 , and 4.5. Table
4.2 presents the average number of rounds for all three cases with and without trust
for Random and Normal Distributions. We may notice that the number of rounds in
the overlap case is lower than in the semi-overlap case, and the number of rounds in
the semi-overlap case is less than in the case with no overlap. Also, with trust, the
number of rounds is less than it is without trust for all cases. The normal distribution
for all cases has less rounds compared to the random case.
Table 4.3 presents the percentage of projects that reached consensus for all three
cases with and without trust for Random and Normal Distribution. We may notice
that the normal mode of preferences is better than the random. An important point
to mention regarding the case of overlap with trust under the random preferences
assumption is that 1% of the projects did not reach consensus because some stake-
holders were not influenced by the trusted stakeholder. Therefore, an agreement had
not been reached.
Table 4.4 presents the average number of rounds of the projects that reached
consensus for all three cases with different consensus thresholds for Random and
Normal Distribution. We may notice that decreasing the consensus threshold reduces
the average number of rounds.
Table 4.5 presents the percentage of projects that reached consensus for all three
cases with different consensus thresholds for Random and Normal Distribution when
applying trust. It is noteworthy that when we decrease the consensus threshold, the
number of projects that reach consensus increases.
The results showed that considering the assumption of the social influence the-
ory improved the consensus decision making performance under the assumption of
rational choice theory. The trust was used as the factor of influences.
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Table 4.4.
Average number of rounds of the projects that reached consensus different
consensus thresholds for Random and Normal Distribution when applying
trust
Preferences Consensus Threshold
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2
Random 4.2 2.7 1.9 1.4 1.2 1.03 1 1 1
Normal 3.8 2.4 1.8 1.5 1 1 1 1 1
Table 4.5.
Percentage of the projects that reached consensus with different consensus
thresholds for Random and Normal Distribution when applying trust
Preferences Consensus Threshold
1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2
Random 87% 94% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 100%
Normal 87% 94% 98% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 100%
4.9 Conclusion
Decision making becomes more challenging when dealing with multi-stakeholder
decisions due to the existence of conflicts among them and the diversity in their
expertise under the rational choice theory assumption. Therefore, adding the premise
of the social influence theory among stakeholders, represented by trust, becomes
important when they make a decision. Such trust is a result of the interactions
among those stakeholders. In this chapter, we proposed a multi-stakeholder consensus
decision-making framework based on trust. This framework takes into account the
interest, which includes the stakeholders’ perceived risk. We designed a simulation of
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scenarios using two assumptions: normal distribution of preferences and random. Our
result showed that trust is useful in the consensus-creating process, as it decreases the
number of necessary rounds and even creates a consensus when there is an extreme
conflict in preferences. Also, performance is better under the assumption of having
normal distribution than under random preferences. In addition, the choice of the
consensus threshold has an effect on the number of rounds. The larger the threshold,
the more rounds are necessary because increasing it decreases flexibility regarding the
decision to select.
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5. RATING MATRIX PERTURBATION
5.1 Abstract
In collective decision-making where several participants involved to agree on one
selection, reaching the consensus among them is important but it is challenging when
the participants have conflicting interests. Therefore, the influence that is based on
the trust from one participant to another could be useful to make the others shift
their interests to be similar to others. Shifting interest can be long term or short term
depending on participants behaviors. In our decision-making framework, there are
different rounds where participants interact by ratings. Each round creates a rating
matrix. In this chapter, we study the rating convergence by analyzing the rating
matrix changes by measuring its perturbations in each round and find the effect of
these changes on reaching the consensus when using a trust and without it. We
built a simulation that generates several decision scenarios. Our result showed that
the changes in the rating matrix under the trust improve reaching the consensus in
term of decreasing the required number of round and increasing the consensus value.
Moreover, our result showed that changing interest in a long term performs better
than short term in term of number or rounds reduction.
5.2 Introduction
In the decision-making process where several stakeholders involved, we need a
mechanism to reach an agreement specifically when the stakeholders have conflicting
interests. In general, the humans’ nature gives them the tendency to decide rationally
by selecting the decision that gives them the maximum satisfaction according to
the Rational Choice Theory [3]. However, in reality, people might have different
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interest. Therefore, relying on rationality makes reaching a consensus decision to
be challenging [137]. As a result, the stakeholders could use the influence on each
other using the assumption of the Social Influence Theory [181] to make their interest
similar and in turn reach the consensus.
In our decision-making framework, the trust of the stakeholder is used to influence
the others. The higher the trust the higher the reputation of the stakeholder. As a
result, any stakeholder with a high reputation could influence the others in term of
recommending decisions or even changing their interests [144]. Changing the interest
can be short term or long term [137]. In this work, the short-term change of interest
is done locally during the negotiation in each round but does not affect the future
choices. The long-term change of interest is done in a way that affects the stakeholder
current and future choices.
In multi-stakeholder consensus decision-making, there is a network of stakehold-
ers who might or might not influence one another. They meet, propose solutions
and modify them in several rounds to reach a solution that suits everyone. During
these rounds, the stakeholders rate each other to declare their opinions regarding the
proposed solutions and these ratings can later be translated to trust. As a result, due
to the involvement of humans who interact during the negotiation, trust among them
comes into the picture.
Trust provides many benefits such as extra information through the impression
the stakeholders develop of each other over time in a particular context, which helps
to reach the consensus [138]. Also, trust indicates the interests similarity among
stakeholders. As a result, the stakeholders’ reputations can be obtained from the
trust. The more ratings, the better because they increase the amount of information
available about the stakeholders. The longer the history, the better because it in-
creases the chances of having more ratings. The fact of having the stakeholders come
from different backgrounds, hold different expertise and not to mention the conflicting
objectives makes the multi-stakeholder decision-making to be challenging.
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Combining the intelligence of the humans and the intelligence of the machine is the
basis of our existing consensus decision-making framework. The humans are useful
resources to add more information when finding a decision by knowing their prefer-
ences when proposing and rating. The machine is used to coordinate the decision
process and to guide the participants.
In this chapter, we aim to study the rating convergence of our proposed decision-
making framework by studying the rating matrix perturbation. The consensus is
achieved when either all the stakeholders propose the same solution or they all give
the maximum rating to one solution. The trust is an influencer factor that lead the
stakeholders to adjust their selections based on the trustworthy stakeholders guides.
Such influences may affect the rating behavior as well as changing their initial interests
they have in a way to be similar to the highly trusted stakeholders.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.3, we list the existing related
works. Then we show the generic decision-making framework in section 5.4. In
section 5.5, we address rating convergence measurement. After that , we explain the
experimental setup and results in sections 5.6 and 5.7. Finally, in section 5.8, we
conclude the chapter.
5.3 Related Work
Interactions among stakeholders when they make a collective decision is important
since they negotiate while they are seeking for a solution to choose. In decision-making
framework that uses machines for moderate the stakeholder negotiations, the interac-
tion could be rating or even written comment to express the others opinion regarding
the individuals choices and preferences [128–136]. Such notion of preferences occurs
in decision-making field [137]. The individuals’ preferences can be changed over the
time due to the changes in the interests. Those interests change can be a result
of the influence by the others [138], the choices made before or even other factors
that are based on the individuals situation at the time of making selection. Several
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studies showed that the individual interest and preferences are changing [138–145]
and these study are different in term of the causes that lead changing the prefer-
ences. In [141], they predicted the changes in preferences based on the feedback of
the negotiation process. [142] presented the dominant theories of belief change that
may be called input-assimilating models. They expressed how the subject’s belief
state is transformed upon assimilation of an input. In addition to the different fac-
tors that change the individuals’ preferences, the choices proposed while making a
decision may affect the preferences or in other word, it shapes them [145]. There is
a study [138] explained the change the initial preference of an individual to match
the others choices, either through coercion from others or selection by the individual
team member. Preferences changes can be short term or long term [137,144,146,147].
Short term preferences affect the current choices while negotiating but the long term
one affects the choices in the future. In social psychology field where they study the
peoples’ behavior, there are different theories that predict the preferences changes.
For example, dissonance theory [139, 148, 149] motivates individuals to change their
preferences to match their prior decision that can be a result of a selection they made
in the past based on influence.
5.4 Multi-stakeholder Decision-Making Model Based on Trust and Risk
We have designed a generic framework for multi-stakeholder decision making based
on trust and risk that produces a decision agreed upon by the participants. In this
framework, the stakeholders negotiate with each other by 5-star rating to declare
their agreement regarding the other solutions. In this section, we give an overview
of our multi-stakeholder decision-making framework. Figure 4.1 shows our multi-
stakeholder decision-making framework based on trust and risk. In the beginning of
the decision making process, the stakeholder starts proposing their solutions that have
corresponding interest value calculated by the utility function. This utility function is
context-dependent. The trust relationship among stakeholders construct the network
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of them. Those trust values form the reputation of the stakeholders. The trust is
computed by our existing trust system [35–43] that is based on measurement the-
ory. Next, the stakeholders rate each other to declare their opinions of the proposed
solutions. Then, the GDM (group decision making model) entity aggregates those
ratings. After that, the aggregated rating values of the solutions are ranked descend-
ingly. The consensus level is obtained by the aggregated rating values . Therefore,
the top value should have a value higher than or equal to a threshold value to indicate
that consensus is achieved. Otherwise, a new round will start.
5.4.1 Rating
If we assume that the rating system is 5-star rating and stakeholder a rates stake-
holder b, then the rating will depend on how far the a’s interest of its own decision
from the interest he gets from what b proposed. f b’s decision give more interest to
a than what a’s proposed then the rating is the the maximum, 5 stars. Otherwise,
we consider the differences between the interest of decision proposed by a and the
interest of decision proposed by b. The larger the difference the lower the rating and
vice versa. Therefore, to compute the star rating associated with the difference, it
requires to transform the difference value range (diff) to 5-star value range. diff
range is [0,1] and the start range is [0,5]. However, since the larger difference means
lower rating, we need to find the transformation function, f(diff), from [1,0] to [0,5],
meaning to find value rate in [0,5] associated with value diff in [1,0]. If we assume
the function to be linear, we may use the affine transformation function to find the
rating from the differences. Using the affine transformation function, we can calculate
the rating using (5.4)
f(diff) = 5 ∗ (1− diff) (5.1)
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5.4.2 Aggregation
The outcome of the rating’s phase is the rating matrix. Suppose that there is a
set of stakeholders, S, a set of decisions, D, and a set of corresponding trust values
for each stakeholder. The stakeholders rate each other as represented in matrix R. In
this matrix, the element rij represents the rating from stakeholder i to stakeholder j
regarding j’s proposed solution. Each stakeholder has an assigned trust value repre-
sented in the vector T. The sum of the trust values is W. The rating weighted average
operator is RWA and computed by using R, T and W (5.5). Here, the trust ,T is used
to weigh the ratings. The outcome is a vector of consensus degrees corresponding to
the proposed solutions. The selected decision is the decision with the maximum con-
sensus degree, which is later compared to consensus threshold to check the consensus
achievement.
T =
[
T1 T2 T3
]
W =
∑3
n=1 Tn
R =

1 r12 r13
r21 1 r23
r31 r32 1

RWA =
1
W
∗ T ∗R (5.2)
5.5 Rating Convergence Measurement
As we indicated before, our framework generates rating matrices during the nego-
tiation, the more the ratings the larger the magnitude of the matrices. Matrix norm
can be used to measure for the rating matrices magnitude and then use it to find the
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perturbations. For example, the Frobenius norm [195] can be used for calculating the
ratings matrix norm by computing the square root of the sum of the absolute squares
of each rating in the matrix. Suppose, the rating matrix is M and has elements rij,
which each rij represents the rating from stakeholder ri to the decision proposed by rj
and n is the number of decision makers, the Frobenius norm is computed by equation
5.3
‖M ‖F =
√√√√ n∑
i
n∑
j
| rij |2 (5.3)
The matrix norm shows how big is the matrix is. Therefore, if the ratings become
higher in every round then the matrix norm becomes larger than the previous round.
Larger norms is an indicator of the ratings convergence to the consensus degree level.
Our interpretation is that trust is an important factor to influence the stakeholders
which leads to increase the matrix norm.
To find the matrix perturbations, we use the difference of norms between the
current round and the previous one. Supposed that there are three stakeholders s1,
s2 and s3 and three consensus degree values c1, c2 and c3 stored in consensus vector,
c respectively.The rating matrix R stores all the rating for one round.
R =

r11 r12 r13
r21 r22 r23
r31 r32 r33

Let’s assume there is a vector,x, of x1,x2 and x3 which has a solution in the following
linear system:
r11x1 + r21x2 + r31x3 = c1
r12x1 + r22x2 + r32x3 = c2
r13x1 + r23x2 + r33x3 = c3
We can write the linear system above as:
Rx = c (5.4)
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Suppose that after one round, changes occurred, ∆. We write the rating matrix , R′
as:
R′ =

r11 + ∆11 r12 + ∆12 r13 + ∆13
r21 + ∆21 r22 + ∆22 r23 + ∆23
r31 + ∆31 r32 + ∆32 r33 + ∆33

There is is a vector, y, of y1,y2 and y3 such that
y = x + ∆ (5.5)
Also, each rating from i to j is changed such that
rij′ = rij + ∆ij (5.6)
This victor has a solution in the following linear system:
r11′y1 + r21′y2 + r31′y3 = c1 + ∆1
r12′y1 + r22′y2 + r32′y3 = c2 + ∆2
r13′y1 + r23′y2 + r33′y3 = c3 + ∆3
We can write the linear system above as:
(R + ∆)y = c + ∆ (5.7)
To compute the perturbation, we find the difference between x and y (equations 5.4
and 5.7) using matrix (equation 5.3) and vector (equation 5.8) norms.
| v |2 =
√√√√ n∑
i
| vi |2 (5.8)
In the result section, we will present whether there is a correlation or not between
the amount of perpetuation and the number of rounds to reach the consensus.
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5.6 Experiment
Experiment objective
The aim of the experiment is to study the ratings changes when several stake-
holders want to make a decision and study the effect of the trust on those rating
changes. Such an effect can be examined through the number of required rounds, the
consensus degree average in each round, and the consensus achievements. We have
designed and implemented a simulation to generate decision-making scenarios. We
used a Netbeans framework with java language to build the simulation software. We
created a database using derby and then linked it to the java program to store the
data.
Experiment setup
In this experiment, we selected five users for each case of the interest overlap. So,
for full overlap interests, we assigned IDs from 1 to 5 to stakeholder, for no overlap
interests, we assigned IDs from 6 to 10 and finally for semi overlap, we assigned IDs
from 11 to 15. Then for each user, we stored the interest vales which is the rating
he/she gives to the movie. For each interest overlap scenario, We created five samples
and each sample has 200 movies selection project. Also, these projects were generated
one time with trust and one without. Therefore, the total projects generated for each
samples were 1200 projects. Additionally, we generated these projects under two
assumptions: one with long term interest and the other is short term. Table 5.1
shows the parameter setup and figure 5.1 shows the scenarios generated.
The stakeholders start a round by proposing movies of high interest to them.
Then they rate each other, which create ratings matrix. After that, the consensus is
computed by aggregating those ratings using RWA operator. If the consensus degree
is lower than the minimum consensus threshold, a new round starts. The stakeholders
have the option to modify their movies selection by choosing the movie that has more
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Fig. 5.1. The scenarios to generate in the simulation.
Table 5.1.
List of the parameters used in the simulation with their corresponding
values
Parameter Description Value
NoSH Number of StakeHolders 15
numbStakehoder Number of StakeHolders per project 5
globalNoD Total number of possible decisions to select
when proposing
100
noS Total number of samples 5
pCount Number of Projects generated per sample 200
roundCount Maximum Number of rounds per project 10
T Trust Value range [0,1]
Interest Interest Value range [0,1]
consThreshold Minimum Consensus Degree 1.0
interest to others than the previous round’s selection or keeping the same selection
proposed in the previous round.
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5.7 Results
In this section, we show the result of the decision making simulation. In this light,
we present the stakeholders movies selection movement during the negotiation for one
of the generated project of the no overlap case. Then, we present the changes of the
rating norm for the projects generated for the no overlap case one when applying
trust and the other without it. Next, we show the consensus degree convergence for
the long term preferences with and without trust. After that, we make a comparison
in term of number of rounds for long term preferences and short term preferences.
One comparison with trust and one without.Finally, we find the correlation between
the rating matrix perturbation and the number of rounds.
Figure 5.2 shows the stakeholders decisions movement for a project that took
5 rounds to reach the consensus. In round 0 (figure 6.3(a)), all the stakeholders
proposed different decisions. In round 1 (figure 6.3(b)), stakeholder 6 changed his
decision to be similar to stakeholder 10. In round 2 (figure 6.3(c)), stakeholders 7
and 9 selected decisions closer to 6 and 10. In round 3 (figure 6.3(d)), stakeholder
9 selected a new decisions closer to 6,7 and 10. Round 4 (figure 5.2(e)) is similar to
round 3. In round 5 (figure 5.2(f)), stakeholder 8 changed his decision to be similar
to the rest. Therefore, the consensus was achieved. Table 5.2 shows the rating matrix
norm values and the consensus degree for the same project. The rating norm kept
increasing as well as the consensus degree.
Figure 5.3 presents the changes in the rating matrix norm during negotiations.
When considering trust, 82% of the interactions had the norm increased, 2% no
change and 16% was decrease. However, without trust, the norm never increased
neither decreased and it remained unchanged.
Figure 5.4 presents the number of rounds for each project without trust 5.4(a) ,
short-term preference with trust 5.4(b) and long-term preference with trust 5.4(c).
We can notice that the number of round for no overlap and semi overlap never de-
creased without trust. However, the rounds can be decreased with trust and it is
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(a) Round 0. (b) Round 1.
(c) Round 2. (d) Round 3.
(e) Round 4. (f) Round 5.
Fig. 5.2. Stakeholders movies selection movement during the negotiation
for no overlap case with trust
more decreasing for long-term preference compared with short-term preferences. The
matrix perturbation has an effect on the number of round. We found that there is a
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Table 5.2.
Rating matrix norm values and the consensus degree for one project.
Round Number Rating Norm Consensus Degree
1 3.098386677 0.81
2 3.666060556 0.88
3 3.794733192 0.89
4 3.752332608 0.92
5 4.507771068 1
(a) With Trust (b) Without
Fig. 5.3. Rating matrix norm changes for no overlap case with trust and
without
moderate negative correlation, -0.45. It means that when the average perturbation
of the project is high then the number of rounds is decreasing.
From the results presented, we found the following:
• Trust helps the stakeholders to reach the consensus when conflicting interest
exists by the influence from the highly trusted participants.
• Trust increases the rating matrix norm in most of the cases. Increase the norm
means increasing the rating which leads to increase the consensus degree.
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• Trust helps changing the preferences whether long-term or short term. Changing
the preference in the long run helps to decrease the number of rounds in the
future.
• Trust helps decreasing the number of project rounds except few cases such as
when a trusted participant has his decision liked by the others and then he
changes his opinion frequently for the coming rounds.
• Trust helps to increase the rating changes which leads to increase the rating
norm and the matrix perturbation accordingly.
5.8 Conclusion
In collective decision-making where several participants involved to agree on one
selection, reaching the consensus among them is important but it is challenging when
the participants have conflicting interests. The influence among them can help to
eliminate this challenge. Such an influence can be obtained from trust of one partici-
pant to another. The trust is useful in changing the participants preferences whether
it is a long term or short term depending on participants behaviors. In this study
we apply our decision making framework that is based on trust for investigating the
rating convergence during negotiation. We used the matrix norm as a measurement
for obtaining the magnitude of the rating matrices and then find the perturbation
accordingly. The larger the magnitude the more chances to reach the consensus. Our
result showed that the changes in the rating matrix under the trust improve reaching
the consensus in term of decreasing the required number of round and increasing the
consensus value. Also, our result showed that changing interest in a long term per-
forms better than short term in term of number or rounds reduction. Moreover, we
found that there is a negative moderate correlation between the matrix perturbation
and the number of round needed to reach consensus.
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(a) Without trust for both long-term and short-
term
(b) With trust for short-term
(c) With trust for long-term
Fig. 5.4. Number of rounds in each project for all the three overlap cases
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6. RATING AGGREGATION
6.1 Abstract
Reaching consensus is critical in a multi-stakeholder decision-making consensus
process that involves many decision makers agreeing on one choice, but it is chal-
lenging when the participants have opposing interests. Hence, influence, which is
based on one member’s trust in another, could be useful for making people change
their interests to be similar to those of others. Changes to interests can be long-term
or short-term, depending on the participants’ behaviors. In our proposed consensus
decision-making framework, the stakeholders negotiate in many rounds by interacting
through ratings. These ratings are used to compute the consensus level, which calcu-
lates the consensus by aggregating those ratings. In this chapter, we study the aggre-
gation of the ratings and apply it in our proposed multi-stakeholder decision-making
framework. Then, we measure the aggregation operators based on their correlation
with the changes in the rating matrix. Our results show that operators who produce
high consensus in the earlier rounds do not necessarily introduce a relationship be-
tween the changes in rating and the number of rounds. Also, the selected consensus
threshold controls the operators’ performance in term of consensus achievement and
the speed of convergence.
6.2 Introduction
In the previous chapters, we introduced our trust-based consensus decision-making
framework (Figure 4.1), in which several stakeholders are involved in proposing de-
cisions and negotiate until they reach a final decision in consensus. We introduced
the assumption of rational choice theory [3] in which people usually follow its frame-
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work when they declare preferences based on the maximum interest they provide.
We also introduce the concept of social influence theory [181] to solve situations in
which stakeholders have divergent preferences, which might lead them to never reach
consensus.
Based on social influence theory, we use influence, represented by trust. Trust is
a relationship among individuals over time based on their interactions. In our pro-
posed trust-based consensus decision-making framework, we used our existing trust
framework, which is based on measurement theory [35–45]. By adopting the trust
concept, we can create influence during negotiations. Stakeholders with high trust
influence others to modify their decisions to be closer to each other. We assume the
temporality of the preference changes. It could be a local change to a current project
or a global change for current and the upcoming projects.
In our proposed framework, we used the weighted average to aggregate stakehold-
ers’ opinions, as represented by ratings, for every selection. However, our proposed
framework is fixable about applying other aggregation operators. Our aim is to find
a suitable method of aggregating the ratings and using trust to weigh the stake-
holders’ selections or actions. Different aggregation operators have been proposed
before. However, some of them are only applicable to voting-style decisions and not
consensus. Therefore, the operator’s choice must guarantee consensus rather than
voting.
In this chapter, we aim to study different aggregation operators for our proposed
decision-making framework (Figure 4.1) by finding their correlation with changes to
rating matrix perturbation. Consensus is achieved when all of the stakeholders ei-
ther propose the same solution or give the maximum rating to one solution. Trust
is an influencer factor that lead stakeholders to adjust their selections based on the
trustworthy stakeholders’ suggestion. Such influences may affect the rating behav-
ior as well as change their initial interests to be similar to those of highly trusted
stakeholders.
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This chapter studies the effect of using different aggregation operators under the
influence of trust by answering the following questions:
• What degree of consensus is produced by those operators?
• What is the speed of convergence for those operators?
• Would starting with less consensus slow down the consensus process?
• Would increasing the ratings matrix perturbation help to decrease the number
of rounds?
• How would the operators perform given changes to the consensus threshold?
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 6.3, we list the existing related
works. Next, in section 6.4, we discuss the aggregation operators. After that , we
explain the experimental setup and results in sections 6.5 and 6.6. Finally, in section
6.7, we conclude the chapter.
6.3 Related Work
For group decision-making applications in which the participants generate ratings
regarding the alternatives, it is important to aggregate those ratings to select the best
alternative among the proposed ones. In consensus decision-making scenarios, all of
the participants declare their preferences through ratings. Therefore, an approach
is needed to aggregate these ratings, to obtain the group’s preferences and simulta-
neously ensure that the group’s preference gives a level of satisfaction to all of the
participants. In general, ratings are usually aggregated using the weighted arithmetic
mean [189–194,196–199]. When using the weighted mean approach, this means that
the participants’ preferences should converge to values that are close to each other,
to guarantee that the aggregated value is becoming closer to the minimum accepted
consensus degree. The weight can represent the member’s reputation. However, many
researchers have proposed schemes for rating aggregations because getting bias with
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the mean. These schemes are different in terms of the aggregation operators used and
the applications for which the ratings are used.
Leberknight and et al. [196] presented a theoretical model using stock market
metrics known as the average rating volatility (ARV), which captures the fluctuation
present in these ratings. The ARV is computed based on the mean rating value over
non-overlapping intervals of N consecutive ratings. Florent and et al. used collabora-
tive filtering systems [197] to compare the accuracy and robustness of three aggrega-
tors: the mean, median, and mode. The results show that the median may often be a
better choice than the mean. Liang and et al [188] systematically evaluated the effects
of different rating aggregating algorithms in the context of a simple distributed trust
inference model. Their results showed that the personalized similarity measure (PSM)
has the best performance compared with the average, half-weighted, weighted major-
ity algorithm (WMA), and beta models. Abdel-Hafez and et al. [189,190]proposed a
new aggregation method for generating reputation scores for items or products based
on customer ratings. They used the weighted average operator and used the normal
distribution to generate the weights. The results of their experiments show that this
method outperforms the state-of-the-art methods of predicting ratings. They did the
same in [191]to generate reputation scores for items on the basis of customer rat-
ings but using the beta distribution for weight generation. Baltrunas and et al. [200]
proposed a rank-aggregation method for group recommendations.
6.4 Aggregation Operators
Suppose that there are n stakeholders s1, s2, .. ,and sn and their trust values t1,t2,
.. ,and tn respectively. The set W={w1, w2, .., wn} contains the stakeholders’ weights,
which are calculated by using the trust values obtained from equation 6.1
wi =
ti∑n
i=1 ti
(6.1)
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Suppose that there is a decision Di proposed by stakeholder si and the other stake-
holders rate this decision in R = {r1, r2, .., rn}. The following subsections show dif-
ferent aggregation operators that use the values from the sets W and R as inputs.
6.4.1 Weighted Sum
The weighted sum (WS) aggregation operator is the same as computing the
weighted average. This operator weighs the rating using the rater’s trust value and
then finds the summation. The WS of the alternative can be computed by equation
6.2
WS =
n∑
i=1
wi ∗ ri (6.2)
6.4.2 Weighted Product
The weighted product (WP) aggregation operator is similar to the WS. How-
ever, it is different from the WS in that the weighted ratings are multiplied in-
stead of summed. This operator was inspired from the multi-criteria decision-making
(MCDM) approaches, with one of the approaches being the WP approach. In this
operator, the ratings are weighted by raising them to the powers obtained from set
W . WP is computed by equation 6.3
WP =
n∏
i=1
ri
wi (6.3)
6.4.3 Similarity Measure
The similarity measure (SM) takes into an account the distance between any pair
of ratings. If the distance is high, the similarity will be low. This aggregation operator
was inspired from [188]. The authors used a personalized similarity measure. To con-
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struct the similarity measure, we first consider the root mean square (RMS)(equation
6.4) for a set of values X = {x1, x2, .., xn}
RMS =
√∑n
i=1 xi
2
n
(6.4)
In our case, these x values are the ratings of the stakeholders, R. The main point
of this operator is to find the average differences for any decision and then compute
the similarity measure. First, the number of interactions among stakeholders, N,
must be found. It can be computed using equation 6.5
N =
n∑
i=1
(n− i) (6.5)
Then. the RMS of the differences, RMSdifferences is computed by equation 6.6
RMSdifferences =
√∑n
i=1
∑n
j=i+1 (ri − rj)2
N
(6.6)
Where i and j are any stakeholders pair. Based on equation 6.6, the SM is computed
by equation 6.7
SM = 1−RMSdifferences (6.7)
Weighted Product Similarity Measure
The weighted product similarity measure (WPSM) is an aggregation operator
that is computed by considering the SM , and weighing the ratings. The weight of
the ratings is computed by multiplying the weight W with rating, R. Equation 6.6
can be represented by adding weight to compute weighted product RMS, WPRMS
(equation 6.8)
WPRMSdifferences =
√∑n
i=1
∑n
j=i+1 ((ri ∗ wi)− (rj ∗ wj))2
N
(6.8)
The WPSM can be computed by equation 6.9
WPSM = 1−WPRMSdifferences (6.9)
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Weighted Exponent Similarity Measure
The weighted exponent similarity measure (WESM) operator is similar to the
WPSM but different in terms of how the weight is used. For the WPSM, weight is
multiplied by the rating. For the WPSM, the rating R R is raised to the power of the
weight, W . Equation 6.6 can be represented by adding weight to compute weighted
exponent RMS, WERMS (equation 6.10)
WERMSdifferences =
√∑n
i=1
∑n
j=i+1 (ri
w
i − rjwj )2
N
(6.10)
The WESM can be computed by equation 6.11
WESM = 1−WERMSdifferences (6.11)
6.5 Experiment
The aim of the experiment was to study the effects of trust on the consensus
process among stakeholders when applying different aggregation operators. The eval-
uation criteria involved studying the consensus degrees and achievement when using
these aggregation operators. Moreover, we study the correlation between the consen-
sus degree of each aggregation operator and the rating average matrix perturbation.
We designed and implemented a simulation to generate decision-making scenarios.
We used the NetBeans framework with Java to build the simulation software. To
store the data, we created a database using Derby and then linked it to the Java
program (Fig.4.3).
Table 6.1 shows the parameter setup. The stakeholders were assigned a number
from 1 to 500 indicating their stakeholder ID. We generated the interests of decisions
for each stakeholder to facilitate the proposing and rating process by randomly gener-
ating a number between 0 and 1.0 for the decisions corresponding to each stakeholder.
When these interest values were generated, we assumed no overlap in interests, since
our experiment was aimed at studying cases with extreme conflicts. The stakeholders
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Table 6.1.
Parameters of the simulation and their corresponding
Parameter Description Value
NoSH Number of StakeHolders 500
numbStakehoder Number of StakeHolders per project 5
globalNoD Total number of possible decisions to select
when proposing
1000
pCount Number of Projects generated 1000
roundCount Maximum Number of rounds per project 10
T Trust Value range [0,1]
Interest Interest Value range [0,1]
consThreshold Minimum Consensus Degree 1.0
start a round by proposing solutions of high interest to them and then rate each other.
After that, the consensus is computed by aggregating the ratings using different ag-
gregation operators. If the consensus degree is lower than the consensus threshold,
a new round starts. The stakeholders have the option to modify their decisions by
choosing a decision that has more interest to others than the previous round’s decision
or keeping the same decision proposed in the previous round.
6.6 Result
In this section of this chapter, we analyze the data generated from the simula-
tion. We study the starting consensus degree for each operator. Then, we explore
the consensus degree’s convergence throughout the round for each operator. Next, we
show the consensus degree throughout the project for each operator. According to
the consensus degree for each project, we study the consensus achievement by assum-
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ing different minimum consensus threshold values. Finally, we study the correction
between the rating matrix perturbation and the consensus degree computed by each
aggregation operator.
6.6.1 Starting value of consensus degree
When the stakeholders negotiate during projects’ rounds, they start with the con-
sensus degree in the first round and then continue the remaining rounds accordingly.
The consensus degree shows how close they are. Figure 6.1 shows the starting consen-
sus degree computed by the aggregation operators. It shows that the WPSM operator
produced the best results in term of the starting consensus degree throughout all of
the projects. WP, in contrast, had the lowest starting consensus degree. In addition,
WS and WP were noticeably close in term of performance, and WPSM and WESM
were also closer to each other.
6.6.2 Consensus Degree Convergence
The consensus degree in each round changes based on the modified decisions
and their ratings. Convergence to the minimum consensus threshold is required to
reach consensus. Each aggregation operator behaves differently in terms of consensus
convergence. Figure 6.2 shows the performance of each operator. In the figure, the
WPSM operator starts with the highest consensus degree in the first round, but its
degree changes slower than WS and WP. In WS, the average convergence from the
first to the last round is +0.19, compared to +0.22 in WP. It was +0.01 and +0.05
for WPSM and WESM, respectively.
6.6.3 Consensus Degree per project
Projects end with a final consensus degree, whether consensus is achieved or not.
Figure 6.3shows the consensus degrees for all of the projects and for each operator.
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.
Fig. 6.1. Staring consensus degree for each aggregation operator.
For the WS operator, 6.3(a), shows that in the early projects, the consensus was low
and then kept increasing because of influence, represented by trust. Similarly, the
WP operator in subfigure 6.3(b)and the WPSM and WPEM operators in, 6.3(c) and
6.3(d) respectively, produced high consensus (between 0.8 and 1) from the earlier
and later projects. Trust influenced these projects too, which helped to maintain the
consensus degree values.
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.
Fig. 6.2. Consensus degree convergence throughout the projects’ rounds
for each aggregation operator.
6.6.4 Consensus Degree Threshold
Negotiation among stakeholders ends when they achieve the consensus or when
the maximum number of rounds reach the limit. Reaching the agreement depends
on the chosen threshold. In this section, we evaluate the four aggregation operators
under the assumption of having the negotiation held with different consensus degree
threshold. The evaluation criteria are the average number of rounds needed and the
number of projects that reached the consensus
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(a) WS (b) WP
(c) WPSM (d) WPEM
Fig. 6.3. Consensus degree values for all of the projects and aggregation
operators
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Number of rounds
Table 6.2 shows the average number of rounds for each aggregation operators
under different consensus threshold. The result shows that WS, WP and WESM
has the same performance in term of number of rounds while WPSM performance is
worse than them. However the performance of WPSM is the best when the minimum
consensus threshold is 0.90. The performance of all operators except WP is the best
when the consensus threshold is 0.75. Our interpretation is that WPSM starts with
a higher consensus compared with others and could be close the consensus threshold.
Therefore, the convergence of this operator is faster.
Table 6.2.
The number of rounds for each aggregation operator for different consen-
sus threshold
Aggregation operator 1.0 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75
WS 6 4 3 2 2 1
WP 6 4 4 3 2 2
WPSM 10 5 1 1 1 1
WESM 6 3 2 1 1 1
Consensus Achievement
Table 6.3 shows the percentage of the projects that reached the consensus with
different consensus threshold. The result shows that when the threshold is 1, all the
operators except WPSM has the same performance and better then WPSM. The
WPSM performance becomes the best when the consensus threshold is 0.90 or lower.
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Table 6.3.
The percentage of the projects that reached the consensus for each aggre-
gation operator for different consensus threshold
Aggregation operator 1.0 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75
WS 78% 88% 96% 99% 99% 99%
WP 78% 87% 94% 97% 98% 99%
WPSM 0% 71% 100% 100% 100% 100%
WESM 78% 94% 99% 99% 100% 100%
6.6.5 Consensus and matrix perturbation correlation
The stakeholders negotiate the decisions and choices of the projects. They rate
each other, and those ratings reflect changes in the rating matrix for the next rounds.
We measure these changes by finding the matrix perturbation. In this section, we
found the average perturbation for each project and compared it to the number of
rounds to study how the aggregation operators reacted with the matrix changes and
how such a reaction affected the consensus achievement speed. The idea was to find
the correlation between the consensus achievement speed and the rating matrix per-
turbation. The question to answer is whether increasing matrix perturbation would
reduce the number of rounds. Table 6.4 shows the correlation for each aggregation
operator. Table 6.4shows a moderately negative correlation between the WS and WP
operators. This means that changes to the rating matrix could reduce the number of
rounds, which speed up consensus being achieved. The WPSM and WESM operators
do not have such a correlation. The following points summarize the results of our
analysis:
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Table 6.4.
Correlation between the rating matrix perturbation and the number of
rounds
Operator Correlation
WS -0.547288655
WP -0.600791601
WPSM 0
WESM 0.329661467
• Consensus degree outset: WS and WP had lower starting consensus compared
with WPSM and WESM.
• Matrix perturbation: WS and WP had a negative correlation between matrix
perturbation and number of rounds, unlike WPSM and WESM.
• Number of rounds: Having a larger starting consensus degree did not necessarily
decrease the number of rounds.
• Consequences convergence: WP had the best performance in terms of conse-
quences convergence throughout the rounds, while WPSM had the worst.
• Consensus degree values: Projects with WPSM and WPEM produce high con-
sensus under the assumption of trust. The same was true with WA and WP
but with lower performance.
• Round reduction: WPSM was the worst when the consensus threshold was 1
but the best when it was 0.90.
• Consensus achievement: WS,WP and WESM had the same performance when
the threshold was 1 while WPSM performance was the worst. When the thresh-
old was 0.90 the performance of the WPSM was the best.
115
6.7 Conclusion
In multi-stakeholder decision-making consensus processes involving many decision
makers agreeing on one choice, reaching consensus is critical, yet it is challenging
when the participants have opposing interests. Hence, influence, which is based on
the trust between members, could be useful for making people change their interests
to be similar to those of others. In our decision-making framework, we aggregate
the ratings to compute the consensus. In this chapter, we studied four aggregation
operators (WS, WP, WPSM, and WESM) and measured their performance based on
their correlation with the changes to the rating matrix. Our results showed that a
larger starting consensus degree did not necessarily decrease the number of rounds.
Also, WP had the best performance in term of consequences convergence throughout
the rounds, but WPSM had the worst. Moreover, there was a negative moderate
correlation between the matrix perturbation and the number of rounds for the WS
and WP operators. Lastly, the selected consensus threshold controls the operators’
performance in term of consensus achievement and speed of convergence.
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7. CONCLUSION
”When people honor each other, there is a trust established that leads
to synergy, interdependence, and deep respect. Both parties make deci-
sions and choices based on what is right, what is best, what is valued most
highly.” Blaine Lee
This thesis developed a framework for multi-stakeholder consensus decision-making
taking into consideration the trust among stakeholders and the perceived risk included
in their interests.
In Chapter 1, this thesis outlined the challenges when dealing with multi-stakeholder
decision-making due to humans involvement. Those challenges involves the diversity
of the stakeholders background which leads to a variety of expertise and, in turn, var-
ious proposals in the decision-making process. Also, the conflicting interests among
the stakeholders, which leads to not agreeing on one decision.Moreover, the stake-
holders might have a partial view of the problem domain, which leads to not knowing
the others decision preferences and expectations.The last challenge is the honesty of
the stakeholders which lead to mislead the decision-making process.Hence, in this the-
sis, trust is an essential part for addressing these challenges. Therefore, the primary
thesis research question was:
What is the trust-based consensus decision-making framework needed
when the stakeholders have conflicting interests?
The proposed decision-making framework (MSCDM) has the following character-
istics
• Stakeholders collaboration by interacting with each other during negotiation
when proposing decisions and expressing opinions about the others decisions.
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• Decision process iteration by having several rounds of negotiation.
• Collective decision outcome by aggregating the stakeholders opinions to find a
decision agreed on by all of them.
• Flexibility by allowing the stakeholders to adjust their proposals.
• Trust among stakeholders.
• Risk with each decision represented by interest.
• Dynamic trust update after each round while negotiating.
• Consensus decision outcome agreed on by all the participants.
• Computer guides by using the machine in moderating the decision-making pro-
cess.
In Chapter 2, this thesis summarized decision-making research using two criteria,
trust and risk. Chapter 2 gave motivation of this work and related the proposed
consensus decision-making framework to previous work on multi-stakeholders or group
decision-making. This thesis applies trust and the risk to develop a framework that
produces consensus decision outcome.
In Chapter 3, this thesis presented a Trust-Based Multi-stakeholder Decision Mak-
ing in Water Allocation System. Chapter 3 built a multi-stakeholder Decision-Making
Model having these characteristics: trust, damages, and benefits as criteria, trust is
associated with the involvement of the human. The model is dynamic by adapting to
the changes over time. The decision to select is the solution that is fair with almost
everyone. This model is the basis for building the generic framework in chapter 4.
In Chapter 4, this thesis presented a generic framework for multi-stakeholder con-
sensus decision-making (MSCDM) based on trust and risk that produced a consensus
decision outcome for many decision-making scenarios. Chapter 4 presented the results
of implementing MSCDM and evaluated the effect of trust on the consensus achieve-
ment and the reduction of the number of rounds needed to reach the final decision.
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This thesis presented rating convergence in the implemented MSCDM framework,
which is a result from the changes of stakeholders’ rating behavior in each round.
The result showed that the trust helps to increase the possibility of agreeing on the
same decision through the influence.
In Chapter 5, this thesis presented rating convergence in the implemented MSCDM
framework, which is a result of the changes in stakeholders’ rating behavior in each
round. Chapter 5 evaluated the effect of the trust on the rating changes by mea-
suring the perturbation in the rating matrix. The result showed that trust is useful
in increasing the rating matrix perturbation and such perturbation has a moderate
negative correlation with the number of rounds.
In Chapter 6, this thesis addressed rating aggregation operators in the imple-
mented MSCDM framework. Chapter 6 presented the design and implementation of
four aggregation operators: weighted sum (WS), weighted product (WP), weighted
product similarity measure (WPSM) and weighted exponent similarity measure (WESM).
The result showed the performance of those aggregation operators in term of consen-
sus achievement and number of rounds needed. The consensus threshold controls the
performance of these operators. WS and WP work best with the higher threshold
while WPSM and WESM work work best with the lower consensus threshold
The consensus decision-making framework needed to produce consensus decision
outcomes has the combination of the humans and the machine intelligence. The
humans add extra information prior making the decisions which help to combine all
the stakeholders partial views of the problem domain and to know the stakeholders
preferences. These extra information develop the trust relationship among those
stakeholders and then such a trust can be used as an influence factor on the others
to reach an agreement. Also, the humans can evaluate the interest of the decisions
by computing their perceived risk, which depends on the context. The machine use
to moderate and guide the stakeholders when they negotiate.
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The proposed decision-making framework combines the following models
• Trust model that is based on the measurement theory.
• Risk model included in the utility component and it is associated with the
interest that include the perceived risk.
• Group decision making model for stakeholders negotiations.
Trust is the core component in the proposed framework and it proved how it
helped to improve the performance of consensus decision-making process by reducing
the time of negotiations and achieving the consensus.
7.1 Future Work
This thesis identifies five areas of future research.
• Apply MSCDM framework in different kind of distributions in term of prefer-
ences and analyze how the framework performs in term of number of rounds
and the consensus achievement.
• Assume different mathematical model of rating in MSCDM and validate the
result on a real application.
• Study the capability of MSCDM framework of detecting and preventing the
malicious decisions.
• Add the machine to stakeholder role, which will lead to have network of humans
and machines having a trust relationship.
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A. MATHEMATICAL MODEL FOR RATING
A.1 Overview
In the proposed framework, rating other stakeholders proposals is required after
they propose a solution solutions phase. In the simulator we built, the rating is 5-star
system. The start rating is related to the interest associated with the stakeholders
solution. As a result, it is important to provide a mathematical model for ratings
that take the interest values as an input and produce the star value as an output.
Example: Two stakeholders A and B propose solutions DA and DB re-
spectively. A rates B according to the interest to him/her from DB, denoted
by IA(DB) and the interest from his/her decision IA(DA). The value of the
difference between IA(DB) and IA(DA) is used to compute the start rating.
We assume the following:
• The interest (I) value is in the range [0,1].
• The differences (diff) between interest is in the range [0,1].
• The star values (star) is in the range [0,5].
• The more (diff) the less (star).
We would like to find the mapping function from (diff) to (star) subject to the
above assumptions.
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A.2 Generating the Mathematical Model
Stakeholder A rates B by computing the differences of interest between their
proposed decisions DA and DB. This difference is denoted by diffA. The value
of diffA is in the range [0,1]. However, if the range is represented by minimum and
maximum values, then our case 1 gives the minimum rating and 0 gives the maximum
rating. So, we would like to find a mapping function:
f : [1, 0]→ [0, 5] such that
f(1) = 0
f(0) = 5
We would like to transform a value x in [1,0] to a value y in [0,5]. If we assume that
we have affine linear transformation, then
5− 0
0− 1 =
y − 0
x− 1
5
−1 =
y
x− 1
−5 = y
x− 1
−5 ∗ (x− 1) = y
This yields to get:
y = 5 ∗ (1− x)
Where y is the start value and x is the difference in interests.
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B. DATABASE DESIGN
Fig. B.1. The relational Database Design of the entities in the simulation
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Table B.1.
List of the tables variables used in the simulation with their corresponding
description
Variable Description
c The confidence value
ConDegree The consensus degree in every rounds held for each project
Decision The decision to propose by every stakeholder in each round in the
project
Interest The interest value associated with each decision corresponding to
stakeholder
m The impression value
NoRounds Number of rounds held for each project
Overlap Indicate the case type (three overlap cases)
PNO Project number
RNO Round number in the project
Selected The selected decision
SFrom The Stakeholder’s ID who rates
SID The Stakeholder’s ID
Stakeholder The Stakeholder’s ID proposing decision
STo The Stakeholder’s ID who is rated
Rate The rating value received.
TrustP Indicate whether trust is used or not.
Trust Trust value computed by m and c
Winner The stakeholder whose decision the highest consensus in each
round.
VITA
141
VITA
Lina Abdulaziz Alfantoukh
Department of Computer and Information Science
Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis, Indianapolis, IN 46202
E-mail: lyna.aziz@gmail.com
EDUCATION
Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis
Ph.D. Computer and Information Science May, 2019
• Dissertation: Multi-stakeholder Consensus Decision-Making Framework Based
on Trust and Risk
• Research Area: Trust and Decision Making
• Advisor: Prof. Arjan Durresi
Relevant Coursework
Algorithm, Advanced Information Assurance, Cloud Computing, Data Communica-
tion and Computer Network, Cryptography, Database Systems, Graphics, Machine
Learning, and Programming Language.
DePaul University, Chicago, IL USA
M.Sc. Computer, Information and Network Security Dec, 2012
• Security Capstone:Security analysis for selected devices
• GPA: 3.9 out of 4.00
142
Relevant Coursework
Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery, Cloud Computing fundamentals,Computer
Security, Cryptology, Distributed System, Emerging Wireless and Mobility, Enter-
prise Security Infrastructure, Ethical Hacking, Information security management,
Legal Issues In Information Security, Network Security, Object Oriented Software
Development, and Security Capstone.
University of Liverpool,UK
M.Sc. Information Technology Dec, 2009
• Dissertation: Standardizing Threats Modeling in Securing Web Applications.
Relevant Coursework
Computer Communications and Networks, Computer Forensics, Computer Struc-
tures, Databases, Information Technology Project Management, Management of QA
and Software Testing, Programming the Internet, and Security Engineering.
King Saud University, Riyadh
B.SC. Computer and Information Science June, 2006
• GPA: 4.23 out of 5.00.
• Final Project: Project Management tool, web-based application. Applications.
.
143
PUBLICATIONS
First Author
• Multi-Stakeholder Consensus Decision-Making Framework Based on Trust: A
Generic Framework. (2018)
• Trust-Based Multi-stakeholder Decision Making in Water Allocation System.
(2017)
• Techniques for collecting data in social networks. (2014)
Co-Author
• Using Twitter trust network for stock market analysis.(2018)
• Measurement theory-based trust management framework for online social com-
munities. (2017)
• Trust management framework for internet of things.(2016)
• Exploring stock market using twitter trust network.(2015)
• Exploring trust propagation behaviors in online communities. (2014)
TECHNICAL SKILLS
Programming:
java, php, ASP, ASP.Net, Pascal, Assembly, C, C++, Python, Visual Basic, HTML,
javascript, MATLAB, R , LISP and Prolog.
Programming Applications:
Microsoft Visual Studio, Netbeans, and xCode
Web Development:
HTML, CSS, Javascript
DBMS:
MySQL, Oracle, Microsoft SQL Server, Apache Derby
OS Proficiency:
Linux, Windows, Mac
144
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
2019 King Faisal Specialist Hospital & RC Saudi Arabia
Data Scientist and Researcher
2018 Indiana UniversityPurdue University Indianapolis IN
Instructor, Data Analysis Using Spreadsheets
2016 - 2017 Saudi Students Association Indianapolis, IN
Media Representative and Webmaster.
2012 DePaul University Chicago, IL
Intern, research project related to Computer Forensics.
2010 Arab SuperComputer Saudi Arabia
Security leader, security department.
2006-2011 King Faisal Specialist Hospital & RC Saudi Arabia
Research Technician, application Developer, and Database designer
2005 King Faisal Specialist Hospital & RC Saudi Arabia
Trainee, networking and web development design.
2004 King Faisal Specialist Hospital & RC Saudi Arabia
Volunteer, safety, security and communication department.
145
TRAINING COURSES
2012 DePaul University Chicago, IL
Cloud Computing Fundamentals.
2010 KFSH&RC Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
SuperSTAR.
2010 University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI
PowerBuilder.
2010 Harvard University Boston, MA
Blaise Programming.
2009 KFSH&RC Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
The Iterative Process in User-Centered Design.
2009 KFSH&RC Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Web service technologies.
2009 KFSH&RC Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Web Development with Rational Application Developer.
2009 KFSH&RC Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Object-oriented Coding Best Practices.
2009 KFSH&RC Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Introduction to PLSQL.
146
2009 KFSH&RC Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Cisco ICND1.
HONOURS AND AWARDS
• STC datathon award nomination (2019)
• Member of Saudi Students Club at IUPUI that won a 1st place award among
Saudi Students Clubs in USA (2017)
• KFSH&RC Scholarship Program (2015 - present)
• Golden Key Membership. (2012 Present)
• King Abdullah Scholarship Program. (2011 - present)
